Summary
- Saudi-Iran rivalry has long deepened conflict lines in the Middle East. But growing mutual vulnerabilities prompted a quiet rapprochement, culminating in the 2023 Beijing de-escalation agreement.
- While it hasn’t led to conflict resolution, this detente has helped contain regional escalation. Dialogue between Riyadh and Tehran remains frequent amid the Gaza crisis and could become even more important after the Israeli killing of Hizbullah’s leader, Hassan Nasrallah.
- Europeans should actively support Saudi-Iran engagement as a vital diplomatic path to regional stability, rather than viewing it as Iran’s attempt to evade US sanctions.
- If Iran’s new leadership is willing to engage in negotiations on the nuclear issue and other files, Europeans should see Saudi Arabia as a channel to help facilitate necessary economic relief to Iran as part of any new deal.
- Europeans could help both countries navigate tension around America’s regional involvement, ensuring Saudi-Israel normalisation does not undermine Saudi-Iran diplomacy.
- If Iran refuses to enter negotiations and relations with the West deteriorate further, Europeans should still consider Saudi Arabia as a valuable mediator between the West and Iran.
Introduction
In the past two decades, the long-standing rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran has significantly amplified instability and conflict across the Middle East and North Africa, particularly since the 2011 Arab uprisings. Surprisingly, both nations are now engaged in a new rapprochement as a result of growing mutual vulnerabilities.
For the Saudis, the rapprochement stems from the realisation that they cannot militarily dislodge Iran – and that their long-time security partner, the United States, is no longer willing to bear the costs of trying. Meanwhile, Iran has recognised that mitigating the impact of Western sanctions will necessarily require opening economic channels with the Arab Gulf states. Following three years of quiet dialogue, Riyadh and Tehran signed a roadmap for de-escalation in Beijing in March 2023.
While this detente has not yet led to long-term conflict resolutions, it remains one of the few diplomatic paths for managing regional tensions, even amid the wider escalatory cycle unleashed by the Gaza crisis. Since Hamas’s 7 October attacks on Israel, and the subsequent Israeli war on Gaza, Riyadh has stepped up its outreach to Tehran to contain broader hostilities. This engagement remains fragile, and is still fundamentally underlain with mutual distrust – but both sides seem to have strategically embraced it. “When it comes to Iran, it is absolutely necessary to maintain relations and we will continue to do so,” stated one senior Saudi official in June. “The Gaza war has helped improve relations, not made them worse,” commented an analyst in Tehran the following month.
Amid a rapidly destabilising regional environment exacerbated by the Israel-Palestine crisis, as well as challenges posed by Iranian opposition to Western interests – covering regional, nuclear, and Ukrainian-related dimensions – European states should now see this unexpected rapprochement as a welcome step rather than a means for Iran to evade Western pressure. Riyadh now has increasing influence and economic leverage in Tehran to help put the brakes on escalation, and Europeans should actively encourage this diplomacy to promote regional stability. The Saudis could press Tehran to get behind – or at least not block – a ceasefire in Gaza and prevent wider war in Lebanon amid escalating clashes between Israel and Hizbullah – whose leader Hassan Nasrallah Israel killed in a bombing in Beirut on 27 September. Saudi engagement could even help encourage negotiations on other critical issues such as Iran’s nuclear programme.
This remains true even if a second Donald Trump administration renews America’s maximum pressure campaign against Tehran and ties to the West deteriorate further. Riyadh is unlikely to actively lobby the US to halt tough measures against Iran, but its influence in Tehran will give it space to engage both parties. The kingdom’s new policy of strategic hedging may encourage it to pursue flexibility to engage economically with Iran, positioning itself as a valuable intermediary between the US and Iran[3] – especially if its relationship with Trump continues to be as positive as it was in the past. Europeans should explore ways to support the Saudis in this role.
The US regional position remains a critical point of divergence between Saudi Arabia and Iran, and will continue to feed ongoing tensions between the two. As noted by one former Iranian official, the perception in Tehran is that the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states “won’t do anything regarding Iran without buy-in from DC.”[4] This explains why Saudi-Iranian economic cooperation has stalled, with Riyadh unwilling to challenge US sanctions. Moreover, Riyadh is still seeking to pursue a normalisation deal with Israel in exchange for US security guarantees and greater access to Israeli intelligence capabilities – moves that Tehran will see in a threatening light.
Overcoming this divergence will partly depend on the US and Europeans not actively making Saudi-Israel normalisation incompatible with Saudi-Iranian diplomacy. Riyadh has already indicated that it will not embrace a new anti-Iran alliance via a normalisation deal with Israel. Europeans should encourage the US – especially under a new Trump administration – to see the stabilising value of these dual tracks.
This paper aims to unpack the evolving dynamics and opportunities of the Saudi-Iranian detente for European stakeholders. Based on interviews with officials and players in both countries and elsewhere in the Middle East, it seeks to understand the regional implications of Saudi-Iranian diplomacy and the extent to which it has translated into stabilisation. It explores what Europeans can do to support sustainable de-escalatory progress on regional issues, and how to engage Riyadh as a channel to help address Iran’s wider problematic behaviour.
About the authors:
Julien Barnes-Dacey is the director of the Middle East & North Africa programme and interim director of the Africa programme at the European Council on Foreign Relations.
Cinzia Bianco is a visiting fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, where she is working on political, security and economic developments in the Arabian Peninsula and Gulf region and relations with Europe.