The Finder | Our monthly Insights | Issue 11 – November, 2024

Issue 11 – November 2024

Following a protracted and contentious process after the European elections in June, which saw significant gains by right-wing and far-right forces, the new European Commission, led by President-elect Ursula von der Leyen, is set to take office on the first of December. In July, von der Leyen was confirmed as Commission President with a large parliamentary majority which included the three so-called “centrist forces”, namely the European People’s Party (EPP), the Socialists and Democrats (S&D) and Renew Europe, with additional backing from the Greens. 

In this context, after the President-elect’s September announcement, concerns emerged among these supporting groups over the proposed composition of the new Commission, sparking fears that the new executive would fall short of their policy expectations. These tensions came to a head during  the hearings earlier this month, leading to a deadlock among the three main groups in von der Leyen’s majority. 

Eventually, the stalemate centred on mutual vetoes on two executive vice-presidents and a commissioner. The EPP blocked the approval of Spain’s Teresa Ribera, while the S&D criticised this stance, accusing the EPP of making Ribera a scapegoat and warning against political instability during a critical period for the EU. Simultaneously, the S&D and Renew Europe raised serious objections to the confirmation of Raffaele Fitto, Italy’s nominee, and Olivér Várhelyi, Hungary’s candidate.

Ultimately, the groups reached a compromise in the form of a “Platform Cooperation Statement.” This agreement, however, drew criticism for echoing von der Leyen’s political guidelines without imposing constraints on the EPP, the largest group in the European Parliament, against forming “alternative majorities.” As such, apart from some adjustments to Várhelyi’s portfolio, the resolution also achieved little substantive change. The press frequently described the process as a “drama” or “saga”, suggesting the controversy amounted to much ado about nothing, with the European Parliament’s authority diminished as a result.

While such criticism remains valid, the outcome can also be viewed as a reflection of deeper political and institutional frictions. Growing divergences among the pro-European groups, which became evident during the commissioners’ hearings and in disputes such as those over the deforestation law, highlight the EPP’s role as a pivotal policy kingmaker in both the Parliament and the Council. 

In fact, although the Lisbon Treaty enhances the European Parliament’s legislative powers under the ordinary legislative procedure, the Council’s role in the EU decision-making process reminds, once again, the European Union’s enduring intergovernmental dimension, a feature of Europe’s institutional setting which has also been, albeit  discreetly, addressed by Mario Draghi. In this connection, it would be fair to state that recent electoral developments in France and the announcement of snap elections in Germany likely exacerbated tensions within European political groups, adding further complexity to the process.

The European Union is about to embark on its next legislative term within this political and institutional context and in light of existential challenges such as, among others, how to foster Europe’s economic competitiveness and sustainability at the same time. Indeed, Europe is confronted not only with the US and China, but also with an increasingly complicated global context both in economic and geopolitical terms. On the one hand, the European Union has already commenced its moves in the international chessboard, as in the case of China; on the other, it is waiting for the US positioning in order to start exchanging with Washington. However, how the European Union as a whole will proceed in tackling both its internal and external challenges remains to be seen.  

In a CEPS Explainer, Sophia Russack elaborated on how the European Parliament has expanded its influence in appointing the European Commission through treaty revisions. In fact, it now formally elects the Commission President and approves the Commissioners, which allows it to shape the policy agenda. Since 1994, confirmation hearings for Commissioners-designate have become standard practice, assessing candidates’ competence, independence, and European commitment. The author also remarked that these hearings have effectively influenced portfolio assignments and the composition of the Commission, becoming more professional over time, although some improvements are still needed. She also highlighted that “besides figuring out who is the best fit for the job, (inter-)institutional power play and party politics additionally play crucial roles”, and that “while the outcome of the 2024 hearings remains uncertain, the process appears to have been potentially tamed by the EPP’s dominance and a culture of political tit-for-tat among the political groups”.

While the European Parliament was in the process of confirming the new commissioners, the results of the US elections were already object of analysis. Accordingly, in a Project Syndicate Commentary, Ian Bremmer noted that Donald Trump’s return to the White House would grant the new president the ability to implement an extensive domestic policy agenda, significantly reshape the federal government, and alter established institutional norms. While his second term would deeply affect the United States, its consequences might be even greater on a global scale. The author portrayed a second Trump’s mandate in which the stakes are higher than his first, while the potential impacts of an unpredictable “America First” foreign policy are likely to be far more significant than they were in 2016 as the likelihood of extreme outcomes has increased. Ian Bremmer also stated that, while Trump can still achieve certain foreign policy successes through his deal-making style and the authority of leading the world’s most powerful nation, the risk of major disruptions in this context is considerably greater.

Whereas, on the question of China and the thorny and recurring debate on Europe’s competitiveness, the raw materials supply chain and Europe’s external challenges, in a European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) Policy Brief, Sara Logan highlighted that, over the past two decades, China has become a dominant force in global supply chains for critical raw materials (CRM) and green energy technologies, creating economic risks and competition for Europe. In response, the EU has formed strategic partnerships with several countries, including in Africa, to reduce reliance on China. However, these efforts will succeed only if European companies invest in CRM supply chains in these partner countries, but current incentives are insufficient. The EU’s partnership with Namibia, for example, has had limited success and may even benefit Chinese firms. To improve this, the EU needs to provide stronger support, including financial incentives and measures to protect against Chinese market manipulation.    

On the same question, but with regard to the role of Saudi Arabia, a SWP Commentary by Meike Schulze drew attention to the process that the country has embarked on in the global competition for mineral resources with strong financial backing and a clear strategy under its Vision 2030. The author emphasised how the Kingdom currently secures mineral resources through international investments and agreements but aims to develop its own domestic mining industry in the long term. While many initiatives are still in the planning stages, Saudi Arabia continues to rely on international partners, she noted. She also stated that it positions itself as a neutral “link” between major powers, strengthening ties with China whilst also competing with it, and offering the West a potential partner for resource diversification. However, the EU still sees cooperation with Saudi Arabia as a potential option, although key conditions for a strategic partnership have not been met yet.

On an adjacent and even higher note, Marc Julienne observed in an IFRI Publication that the global competition to harness quantum science is becoming more intense and that China, aware of its strategic importance for economic, military and scientific progress, is prioritising quantum breakthroughs to alter the balance of power, particularly in its rivalry with the United States. President Xi Jinping has highlighted the significance of scientific innovation, especially in quantum technologies, to drive national growth and enhance security. However, the author also noted that, despite having made significant progress, China may encounter difficulties in maintaining its competitive edge. The author also affirmed that the Chinese quantum industry struggles with insufficient private investment and largely depends on governmental backing, while growing geopolitical tensions, especially with the US, could limit China’s access to vital technologies. He concluded that the next ten years will be critical as China works to overcome these challenges in its pursuit of quantum leadership. 

Whereas, on a similar but more European note, Pieter Zwaan in a Clingendael Institute Policy Brief remarks that the EU has adopted a more unilateral strategy for creating sustainable trade measures, focusing on reciprocity. In the agri-food sector, these measures are often seen as promoting fair competition for EU farmers. However, he elaborated, predicting their effects is challenging due to the complex and unpredictable interactions with other factors. To improve this, more thorough impact assessments and a reflective approach are needed when implementing new unilateral measures. The author also called for better impact assessments and a reflexive approach when adopting new unilateral measures to make it possible to set unilateral reciprocal standards, when needed, to reduce unforeseen adverse impacts.

Going back to the question of EU-Africa relations, an ECDPM Article by Hanne Knaepen argued that the Africa-Europe adaptation partnership is encountering major challenges, particularly in terms of securing adaptation finance. She examined strategies to enhance joint adaptation initiatives, with an emphasis on the EU’s role amid escalating geopolitical tensions and changing political priorities. She focused on the question of climate finance by stating that climate adaptation finance is becoming less significant in several areas. In global discussions, African least developed countries and small island developing states are often overshadowed by the BRICS group, which does not always prioritise adaptation concerns. At the same time, she concluded, shifting geopolitical dynamics, such as Europe’s increased spending on Ukraine, defence and migration, threaten to redirect funds, including grants, that were intended for international cooperation and climate adaptation finance.

While the conflict in Ukraine seems to be on the cusp of a turning point, the European Union is increasingly questioning how to improve not only defence but also cyberdefence capacities. Accordingly, a Finabel Publication explored the European Union’s response to hybrid warfare, especially after Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014. The article started by defining hybrid warfare, looking at its historical background and current security challenges and examined the EU’s strategies, such as the establishment of the Hybrid Fusion Cell, and evaluated their effectiveness. Acknowledging the EU’s role in leveraging soft power alongside NATO’s hard power, the author also discussed the difficulties arising from geopolitical uncertainties and the need for trust-building among member states. Additionally, it underscored the importance of strengthening the EU’s capabilities, as outlined in the 2022 Strategic Compass, and offered suggestions for improving resilience against hybrid threats. The author advocated for a proactive approach to uphold international law and engage civil society, reinforcing the EU’s role in combating hybrid warfare in an increasingly complex security landscape.

On the same note, but on the interrelations between public finances, public debate and defence, a CER Policy Brief by Luigi Scazzeri noted, slightly before the announcement of the results of the US elections, that Russia’s large-scale invasion of Ukraine had disrupted European security and added that, as Americans prepared to vote for a new President, Europeans were also concerned about a diminishing US commitment to their defence. The author also highlighted that a potential Trump presidency could weaken NATO and reduce deterrence efforts, but, even if Kamala Harris won, Europeans would still need to take more responsibility for their defence, as the US would need to allocate more resources to address China’s growing military presence in Asia. 

This editorial is authored by Massimiliano Gobbato, Communications Director. Contributions by PubAffairs Communications Team’s Nicole Finucci, Kristina Vilenica and Jacopo Bosica to the drafting of ‘The Finder’ are gratefully acknowledged.

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