The US midterm elections take place on November 3rd, and the Democratic Party has a nine-point lead in the generic ballot among likely voters. This puts it on track to regain the House of Representatives and perhaps narrow the gap in the Senate—or even turn it blue.
Even if a Democratic win allows the party to use hearings and investigations to make the president’s decision-making more transparent, however, Donald Trump’s approach to US foreign policy will likely be unchanged. He has almost entirely disregarded his own Republican majority and will feel even less constrained by a Democratic one. He will still be able to use his presidential power extensively: imposing tariffs, ordering troop withdrawals, weakening America’s longstanding alliances, and potentially launching military operations or striking business deals with foreign governments. His veto will block any meaningful Democratic legislation.
Europe should nonetheless keep an eye on the results. The midterms are a barometer of what comes after Trump: they will show the balance of power between the progressive and centrist camps of the Democratic Party and could force an internal debate about the competing visions of America’s global role. Europeans should start preparing for how these debates will change the transatlantic relationship after Trump.
What could happen under a blue Congress
A Democratic majority in Congress would still matter for the transatlantic relationship. It would be harder for Trump to pursue any Greenland-style claims on European territory. Many Democratic candidates are focused, in the run-up to the midterms, on rooting out corruption, malpractice and abuse of authority. A Democratic majority is thus likely to launch investigations and possibly impeachment proceedings—for example against secretary of war, Pete Hegseth, who is held in contempt due to his handling of the military operations in the Caribbean and America’s war on Iran.
With greater leverage, Democrats could force public debates on Trump’s “business diplomacy”. This matters because some of the administration’s worst instincts on Europe, including hostility towards the EU and an interest in reopening commercial relations with Russia at the expense of Ukrainian territory, stem from transactional business diplomacy benefiting businesses and intermediaries in the president’s inner circle.
In August 2026 the Department of Justice extended executive privilege to private individuals who deal with the White House, limiting Democrats’ ability to launch investigations against them. Nevertheless, hearings under a blue Congress could indirectly constrain Trump’s use of business diplomacy as a driving principle of foreign policy by removing the expectation of impunity among the investors, intermediaries and foreign governments involved. The Democratic Party would also be better placed to highlight the connections between expansion of the Trump family’s business interests, foreign-capital inflows, regulatory decisions and foreign-policy outcomes, making future deals with countries like Russia less attractive.
Trump’s last two years could be his most volatile yet
Trump will not, however, operate more cautiously under a Democratic Congress. Instead of feeling constrained, he is likely to blame the Democrats for any domestic and international failures that occur in 2027 and 2028, which could make the last two years of his presidency more volatile.
Besieged by the Democratic Party and eager to stay relevant, he will be unable to—and uninterested in—domestic legislative reforms. Trump will likely double down on foreign policy to gain the exposure he seeks: broadcasted interactions with global leaders, securing financial advantages for his allies, and leaving a stamp on history. He is likely to pursue initiatives that create the appearance of success, particularly in Europe, the Middle East, the Americas and Greenland.
The war in Iran will heavily limit the president’s options. Depleted US stockpiles are putting pressure on supplies of Patriot interceptors and other high-end munitions. Replenishment is likely to take years. Since February 2026, the war has cost around $38bn. And if Trump fails in one region, he will find another in which to demonstrate his strength, such as his recent “deal” on Greenland, which briefly moved public attention away from Iran. Whether it is the diesel deal or a purported energy ceasefire between Russia and Ukraine, his announcements tend to be performative rather than targeted towards achieving a particular foreign policy aim. That said, bolder adventures cannot be discounted—toppling the Cuban regime, for example, would qualify, for him, as a politically beneficial presidential success.
The US may also have to replenish domestic munition stocks by diverting orders intended for allies, given doubts that it could sufficiently confront China in the Pacific. As a result, the Pentagon’s pending review of US force posture in Europe will likely reflect efforts to shift conventional military responsibility in NATO towards European ownership, reduce European dependence on American capabilities and free resources for the Indo-Pacific. This is in line with what US undersecretary of war for policy, Elbridge Colby, calls “NATO 3.0.”
A smooth transition is not guaranteed. The force posture review, expected by December, might show that Trump’s anger towards European governments that did not support the war in Iran is driving his withdrawal of troops from Europe. Congress has set a statutory floor under US troop numbers in Europe, but the president has contested its legality. Even under a Democratic Congress, the US courts are unlikely to settle the matter quickly enough to make a difference within the remaining two-year period.
The administration’s flirtation with—and support for—European far-right parties is also likely to intensify as an extension of the domestic culture war at the centre of the Republicans’ electoral narrative. Given the unpopularity of Trump’s policies, whether economic management, the war on Iran, or tariffs, the Republicans are relying on culture-war themes to appeal to a disgruntled MAGA base. At the Republican National Convention, vice-president J.D. Vance’s speech focused almost entirely on such issues. More recently, he used the riots and looting in France to claim that a Democratic victory in the midterms would bring the same type of chaos to America.
The Democratic Party battle is internal
A Democratic victory in the midterms is less about constraining Trump’s executive power and more about mobilising its party base ahead of the 2028 presidential election. How will the Democratic Party prepare for what comes after? And what can Europeans learn from the Democratic Party’s approach to American foreign policy?
The race to the White House will start on November 4th. The midterms should clarify which topics engage voters, which candidates energise them, and whether progressives can offer party voters what MAGA offered Republicans—that is, a highly mobilised activist base able to win back the White House in 2028. But the Democratic Party remains embattled and divided. It has reached no common understanding as to why Kamala Harris lost in 2024. The party’s autopsy report did not settle internal disputes between those who blame Harris’s defeat on Joe Biden’s delay in standing aside, those who blame Biden’s failure to address Israel and Gaza, or those who blame the party’s inability to connect with voters’ economic struggles.
This balance matters because foreign policy remains divided between the party’s progressive and centrist wings: while different propositions are emerging, none yet dominate. For example, progressive voters are pressuring Democrats to rescind the party’s unconditional support for Israel; calls to attach conditions to aid, and for Democrats to denounce the situation in Gaza and the West Bank, are also increasing. An internal debate is simmering over America’s strategic competition with China, and US leadership in tech and AI. Calls by progressives to regulate the tech industry are growing louder, but factions close to the Democratic leadership believe the US should continue to promote tech innovation to compete with China.
On Europe, however, ECFR research demonstrates that European affairs barely feature in Democratic foreign-policy conversations. This is problematic when it comes to security: looking ahead to 2029, a new administration could find in Europe a friendly but weakened and inward-looking ally. A Democratic administration might be more willing to help with Europe’s security challenges but unable to restore the old transatlantic security bargain. It is therefore time for Europe to start building connections with Democratic Party frontrunners such as Harris, Gavin Newsom, Pete Buttigieg and Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez.
Getting ahead of 2028
A Democratic win in the midterms could matter enormously in the long term but change very little in the short term. A Congress controlled by the Democratic Party is unlikely to constrain Trump’s foreign policy, but it should be able to expose his transactional nature. It will also bring into focus Democratic foreign policy debates and enable the party to begin shaping the future of American foreign policy.
Of course, Europeans could face another Republican president in two years’ time. They may have to deal with another government that is driven by the interests of MAGA voters and unwilling to make restoring the transatlantic bargain a priority.
Europeans thus need to start shaping the post-Trump agenda. They can use their political and military leverage to engage with Republican leaders and influence the US force-posture adjustments in Europe. They should aim for an orderly transition to NATO 3.0, and explicitly reject America’s business-driven diplomacy towards Europe and Russia. If the Democratic Party does well in the midterms, congressional investigations could raise the reputational costs for those involved.
Most importantly, European politicians should engage with the new generation of Democratic leaders, including progressives who do not automatically back the traditional US-Europe relationship. And Europe need not hark back to a moribund international order. It should instead propose a new agreement with the US based on a positive agenda: stabilising trade, rebalancing NATO, regulating AI and reviving exchanges—if not trust—across the Atlantic. Such a proposal could restore energy back into the alliance, should the pendulum swing back to the Democratic Party in 2028.
About the authors
Dr Célia Belin is a senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations and head of its Paris office since January 2023.
Majda Ruge is a senior policy fellow with the United States programme at the European Council on Foreign Relations, based in Berlin.