On 3 October, some 800 000 Latvians participated in an election to fill all 100 seats of the Seima and vote for a new(ish) government. In the EU bubble, the Baltic country isn’t a headline mainstay, though its political landscape has been nothing short of turbulent. But after three governments in four years, caretaker Prime Minister Andris Kulbergs’ centrist-regionalist, green-conservative United List won voters’ confidence (35.77 % of the vote and 42 seats) with a promise of stability.
Behind him, two right-wing populist parties – the ardent Trumpist Latvia First and the rising Sovereign Power – claimed second (13.27 %) and third place (11.89 %) respectively, while the previous winner, the centre-right New Unity fell to 6.43 %. What does this mean for Latvia’s place in the EU or about the far-right phenomenon that we’ve seen emerge elsewhere?
Kulbergs is here to stay…
Latvia’s last general election saw incumbent Krišjānis Kariņš achieve a decisive victory (19.19 %), yet no cabinet that followed – just like any Latvian government since 1990 – made it to a full term. Kariņš’ coalition with United List and the national-conservative National Alliance fell apart after much back-and-forth over the nomination of Edgars Rinkēvičs for President and Kariņš’ failed attempt to widen the coalition. He was succeeded by party-mate Evika Siliņa, who chose to govern in a more centrist set-up with the Union of Greens and Farmers and the Progressives (Greens/EFA). That cabinet lasted three years, ultimately being toppled by a security scare and a corruption scandal.
In May 2026, Andris Kulbergs followed as a caretaker prime minister. A businessman affiliated with – but not a member of – United List, he led a four-party coalition with New Unity, the National Alliance (ECR) and the Greens and Farmers. Up until this reshuffle, the election outcome seemed like a toss-up: polling before Siliņa’s exit suggested that the far-right Latvia First enjoyed a modest lead ahead of the Progressives, with three others neck-and-neck around the 10 % mark. After Kulbergs’ takeover, the United List quickly gained and took the lead by mid-June, having only increased its lead since.
Kulbergs’ victory is thus no surprise, but neither is the rise of the ‘fringes’, as Latvia First and Sovereign Power both roughly received the seats pollsters expected them to. Nevertheless, the two parties are hardly comparable. Though both promote ‘Christian values’ and seek to drop the embattled, EU co-funded Rail Baltica project, Sovereign Power promises to end military support for any ongoing conflicts, including continued EU aid to Ukraine, while Latvia First is openly Trumpist and Atlanticist, hoping to increase military purchases from the US.
Their electorates also aren’t identical, largely due to Latvia’s significant Russian-speaking minority making up a third of the population, though nearly 9 % are ‘non-citizens’ who can’t vote. Since Harmony, the primary party for Russian speakers, collapsed in the aftermath of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, voters sought an alternative in the form of Sovereign Power.
Meanwhile, Latvia First counts on the support of dissatisfied ethnic Latvians. Led by the populist business tycoon Ainārs Šlesers, the party has recently grown to recognise that they need the minority’s vote and has been courting Russian speakers. But their unshakeable transatlantic focus is worlds apart from Sovereign Power’s aim of creating distance from both the US and NATO.
In a country with such a prominent minority, whose rights have been curtailed and threatened by the mainstream parties with ‘derussification’ and displacement for ‘disloyalty’, being attracted to the fringes isn’t surprising. How candidates approach the Russian-speaking population could be decisive for the country’s future and it’s already reshaping political dynamics.
To be sure, Kulbergs has ruled out a coalition with Sovereign Power and seemed to indicate his unwillingness to work with Latvia First, stressing that the ‘mishmash’ of people and ideologies making up the party seem ‘incomprehensible’. His options for a governing majority (51 seats) are subsequently the National Alliance (10 seats), the Progressives (9) and New Unity (7).
Kulbergs seems to be keen on forming a centre-right pro-EU coalition in the vein of his current set-up, so it’s likely he’ll team up with the National Alliance and New Unity again rather than moving more towards the centre with the Progressives.
…but so is the far right
Above all else, it doesn’t look like the Latvian elections will cause significant shake-ups in the European Council. Kulbergs is set to continue and – barring any turbulence – will chair Latvia’s Council Presidency in the second half of 2028. Sensitive files requiring unanimity, like sanctions or support for Ukraine, won’t be impacted either. Earlier in September, Kulbergs stood alone against France’s push for a deal which included the delisting of the Russian-Uzbek oligarch Alisher Usmanov, ultimately backing down only to impose national sanctions instead.
The line supported by the EU mainstream, such as simplifying and delaying Green Deal measures will likely be shared by Kulbergs II. There should also be continuity on the MFF and a bigger budget – with Latvia’s strong pro-cohesion and pro-farmers stance intact – and largely on Rail Baltica, which the centre-right wouldn’t cancel but may review.
Despite these alignments, for the EPP – which has held EU decision-making in an iron grip – Kulbergs staying cements the loss of the European Council seat that they suffered after Siliņa’s ouster. In fact, New Unity’s fall from grace is a blow to the EPP in general: the alliance that spent 15 years in power – counting Brussels-heavyweight and former premier Valdis Dombrovskis in its ranks – just about cleared the threshold and will become the smallest group in the Seima.
Even if the United List’s victory denies the far right a place in the government, this election is still one of many where they made undeniable gains while the EPP slipped. Particularly for EPP-chief Manfred Weber, who has sought to regain lost voters by sliding ever-closer to and cooperating with the far right, this may be yet another reminder that the tactic isn’t resonating with the European electorate.
And though Latvia is expected to remain a reliable EU partner, the far right can’t be fully kept away from shaping parliamentary outcomes on important matters. Issues such as withdrawing from the Istanbul Convention, amending the constitution to only recognise ‘two sexes’ or getting ‘tough’ on migration could garner cross-party support.
Overall, this mirrors the trend of increased backlash against equity and fundamental rights safeguards, which many moderates are all-too-keen to accommodate – putting EU values in jeopardy when not even the EU’s heavy-hitters are ready to protect them.
About the author
Júlia Pőcze is a Researcher in the Institutions unit at CEPS.