Donald Trump is serious about wanting to take over Greenland. Especially following the operation seizing Venezuela’s Nicolás Maduro, the US president has made his intention abundantly clear. “The United States needs Greenland for the purpose of national security”, he posted on January 14th in just the latest in a series of unequivocal signals.
How should Europeans respond? Trump thrives on empty space, ambiguity and fear of US power. Europe’s task is to fill the space calmly, collectively and pre-emptively. The joint statement on January 6th by European leaders was a good start and a strong statement of resolve. So too is the ongoing deployment of troops to Greenland by some governments. But more is needed.
The good news is that Europeans have leverage. In Trump’s language, they have cards. Time is the major factor. Trump wants to move soon. He already faces bipartisan criticism in Congress for his coercive diplomacy, midterm elections in November and the end of his presidential term in three years. Political shifts within Greenland and any commercial benefits of US annexation would take much longer to materialise (if they materialise at all). By acting fast, European leaders can outflank the administration. They are right to be cautious in what they say—but must be clear-eyed about the challenge and decisive in curbing the chances of escalation.
The ten proposed measures outlined below are meant to raise the political, economic and alliance costs of unilateral action so early and so visibly that Trump’s administration thinks twice—and considers settling for something like the investment and security arrangements already on offer from Greenland and Denmark.
Europe’s ten Greenland cards
- Build an explicit European Arctic coalition
- Europeanise the security presence in Greenland
- Anchor support for Denmark and Greenland politically
- Pre-commit to sanctions on occupation profiteers
- Signal conditionality on Arctic cooperation
- Use NATO ambiguity strategically
- Flood Greenland with European investment
- Talk to Americans, not just the administration
- Treat this as a rehearsal, not an exception
- Normalise contingency planning
Why this time is different
Greenland’s strategic importance to the US dates back to the 19th century, and successive US administrations have explored acquiring the island. Since the second world war Washington has enjoyed extensive access to it under the 1951 Greenland Defence Agreement. But US Arctic engagement declined after the cold war. Where Washington once operated 17 bases and stationed over 10,000 troops in Greenland, today it maintains a single base with a small number of troops. Icebreaking capacity remains limited, and American policymakers and analysts increasingly speak of “losing the race in the Arctic” as Russia and China expand their presence in the region. Climate change, melting permafrost and the prospect of new shipping routes and resource extraction have amplified this US rhetoric.
Trump’s fixation on Greenland emerged during his first term, when he publicly proposed purchasing the island. European leaders largely treated the episode as a curiosity rather than a warning. Yet Trump’s interest persisted. He reopened a US consulate in Nuuk in 2020 and officials who worked with him described his focus on acquiring Greenland as unusually intense and enduring. Upon returning to office in 2025, Trump framed it as a national security necessity and accused Denmark of failing to defend the territory adequately.
European attempts at accommodation followed. Denmark offered the US further cooperation: expanded basing and infrastructure access, deeper Arctic security coordination and openness to alignment on mineral investments. These offers aimed to remove any plausible security rationale for territorial acquisition. Trump rejected them. That refusal strongly suggested that access, minerals and cooperation were not his objective. In parallel, Denmark and the EU have increased their engagement and investments in Greenland. In mid-December, Denmark’s Defence Intelligence Service quietly classified the US as a potential national security threat—a profound shift for a country that fought alongside American forces in Iraq and Afghanistan and suffered among the highest per-capita casualties of any ally.
Days later, Trump reignited the issue decisively. He appointed Louisiana governor Jeff Landry as US special envoy to Greenland, a role explicitly connected to his claims to it. He also appointed Texas venture capitalist Thomas Dans as head of the US Arctic Research Commission, reinforcing the administration’s focus on Greenland as the heart of its Arctic strategy. After the US military operation in Venezuela, figures within or close to the administration linked it to Greenland and Trump’s designs on the territory. Trump himself has been frank about these: “Anything less than [annexation] is unacceptable,” he posted on January 14th.
These developments clarified the nature of the challenge facing Europe. This is not a misunderstanding to be resolved through dialogue, nor a bargaining problem awaiting a better offer. Trump has already rejected both European offers of cooperation and Danish concessions on access. His language consistently frames Greenland not as a security partnership but as a matter of ownership, permanence and control. The worldview on display resembles real estate acquisition more than strategic defence planning. The implications of these developments are severe and could test European unity and coherence.
About the Authors:
Katrine Westgaard is a programme and research assistant for the European Power and European Security programmes at the European Council on Foreign Relations, based in the Madrid office.
Vessela Tcherneva is deputy director of the European Council on Foreign Relations.
Jeremy Shapiro is the research director of the European Council on Foreign Relations.
Jana Kobzova is co-director of the European Security Programme and senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations.
Mark Leonard is co-founder and director of the European Council on Foreign Relations, the first pan-European think–tank.
Jim O’Brien is a distinguished visiting fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations.
Dr Jana Puglierin is a senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations and head of its Berlin office since January 2020.