Problem
Some European leaders may feel somewhat relieved at the outcome of the Alaska summit between Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin on August 15th. After all, the worst-case scenario—a sweeping deal pressuring Ukraine to cede swathes of land to Russia—did not transpire. But relief would be a mistake. The direction of travel the summit indicated does not bode well for European interests.
For one thing, the fact remains that neither the Ukrainians nor their European allies were at the table in Anchorage. Their advocacy for Ukrainian participation fell on deaf ears, underscoring European marginalisation in talks about the future of their own continent. In a subsequent interview with Fox News, Trump asserted that it was up to President Volodymyr Zelensky “to get it done” and that European states “have to get involved a little bit.”
It is reasonable to assume that Putin used his time with Trump to press his narrative about the root causes of the war: Ukraine’s independent course, its perceived anti-Russian integration into Western institutions, and the broader erosion of Russian influence in eastern Europe. Trump, who appears to share elements of Putin’s worldview, also indicated that he may delay tough sanctions that he had previously threatened.
All this reinforces the risks to Ukrainians and their European allies of continued US leverage over their security.
Solution
The solution is to redouble efforts to reduce that leverage. Due to economic, institutional and military disparities, the EU, its members states and partners like the UK cannot yet replicate the American role in West-Russia relations. Europe’s goal should therefore be to achieve strategic relevance in the short run while moving towards full strategic autonomy in the long run. This comprises three main steps.
First, building strong European military forces is essential for projecting strength and credibility in the eyes of authoritarian leaders like Trump and Putin. That means targeted capability- and integration-building within existing EU and NATO institutional frameworks. Particular priorities include improving command-and-control coordination and civil-military integration; procuring large numbers of unmanned systems, transporters and counter-drone capabilities; and reforming reserve systems to be able to generate large numbers of recruits quickly.
Second, the EU can begin treating Ukraine as if it were a de facto (non-member) security partner, so that Ukraine’s armed forces can sustain their country’s long-term defence even without US backing. That means ongoing and increased European arms transfers, but also deeper integration measures like basing Ukrainian veterans at European training grounds and military academies—and even taboo-breaking steps like recruiting volunteer troops from EU member states to bolster Ukraine’s attritted armed forces.
Third, the EU should play a more assertive, conditional role in its wider eastern neighbourhood. In Moldova, it can tie increased macro-financial and energy backing to clear rule-of-law benchmarks, and fund an expanded EU cyber and disinformation support mission. In the south Caucasus, Brussels should not only back the US-brokered normalisation between Armenia and Azerbaijan, but also play a leading role in realising it through backing for border policing, reform-enabling financial support, and phased visa facilitation (all linked to rule-of-law progress).
Context
On August 15th, Trump warmly received Putin at Joint Base Elmendorf–Richardson in Anchorage. While the Russian state media portrayed the summit as a historic and unprecedented event, the original plan for a luncheon for delegations and a longer press conference was cancelled. The summit took place against a backdrop of Trump pushing Europe and Ukraine to reach a deal with Russia, and threatening to withdraw American military assistance from the continent.
About the Author
Kirill Shamiev is a policy fellow with the Wider Europe programme at the European Council on Foreign Relations. He focuses on Russia’s civil-military relations and domestic politics and policymaking.