On 30 July, between 50 000 and 60 000 people tried to reach the Spanish enclave of Ceuta in North Africa. At least 88 died and many remain missing. What these events really show is how restrictive migration policies create huge risks to human lives – and feed political opportunism. Where regular pathways don’t exist, people must choose between a dangerous route and no route at all.
This vulnerability can then be exploited by governments and political actors. Within hours, these events were instrumentalised to cast doubt on Spain’s regularisation policy, question Schengen, demand greater control by third countries and pursue wider geopolitical disputes.
These arguments serve pre-existing political agendas and justify irrational fears about migration – exploited directly by the far right and worsened by others acting defensively in response.
Spain’s regularisation is not the main cause
In Spain, the Partido Popular’s secretary-general, Miguel Tellado, said that nobody could be surprised that thousands wanted to enter a country that regularises one million people ‘overnight’. Vox leader Santiago Abascal went further, describing the crossings as an ‘invasion’ and naming Spain’s PM Pedro Sánchez its promoter.
Italy’s foreign minister, Antonio Tajani, wrongly claimed that Madrid had granted Spanish – and therefore European – citizenship to more than 500 000 ‘irregular migrants’.
The extraordinary regularisation actually ran from 16 April to 30 June 2026. It provided a one-year residence and work authorisation – not nationality – to people who had arrived in Spain before 1 January 2026 and could demonstrate five months of continuous residence. The application window closed a month before anyone entered the water in Ceuta.
Claiming that regularisation attracts arrivals isn’t supported by strong evidence. Regular status protects people from abuse and exploitation, while enabling them to return to their country of origin without losing the ability to re-enter regularly. Italy has been among the most frequent users of regularisation, including under governments involving Tajani’s own party.
In the days preceding the events in Ceuta, false and misleading claims circulated on social media, including on a recent Spanish Supreme Court ruling, arguing Spain was ready to admit those who reached the enclave.
This may also have referred to regularisation. But the real issue is the misinformation – not Spain’s domestic policies.
‘Suspending’ Schengen isn’t the answer – and it’s not a thing
Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni announced the ‘suspension of Schengen’ and introduced air and sea border checks with Spain for one month. Denmark, Finland and other Member States also questioned whether Spain had adequately protected its border.
But reaching Ceuta does not allow for unchecked access to mainland Spain and the wider Schengen area. Identity and document checks take place on sea and air connections from the enclave to mainland Spain.
The Schengen Borders Code allows for Member States to reintroduce internal border controls in response to an unforeseeable serious threat requiring urgent action. Such controls must be motivated, proportionate and a last resort, but years of inaction from the European Commission have normalised disproportionate and prolonged internal border controls.
Italy hasn’t explained what’s the threat at its own borders, particularly as nobody who arrived in Ceuta reached mainland Spain, let alone Italy.
Furthermore, the idea of ‘suspending Schengen’ – or excluding Spain from it – has no legal meaning. The Council may recommend internal controls where serious and persistent deficiencies at the external borders threaten the area’s functioning, but even then, Spain couldn’t be expelled from Schengen.
Rather than showing solidarity with Spain, EU governments used the event to justify further attacks on Schengen and score political points, domestically and in Brussels, by playing into the far right’s agenda.
Externalisation isn’t a solution – it’s part of the problem
Following a letter signed by 22 heads of state and government, the Irish Presidency convened an extraordinary Justice and Home Affairs Council meeting on 4 August. Ahead of the meeting, Meloni pressed for EU-funded return hubs in third countries modelled on Italy’s ‘Albania model’. In the meeting, ministers converged on reinforcing returns, strengthening borders and building ‘deep partnerships’ with third countries – in other words, more externalisation.
Ironically, Ceuta itself illustrates the risks of placing migration control in the hands of third countries. Morocco has received substantial EU funding, including for migration and border management. The net result is that Morocco’s political priorities shape how and when this border is controlled.
After Spain admitted Western Sahara’s Algeria-backed Polisario Front leader, Brahim Ghali, for medical treatment in 2021, Moroccan border controls eased and around 8 000 people entered Ceuta. On 20 July 2026, Sánchez visited Algeria. And ten days later, the Moroccan border with Ceuta wasn’t controlled as usual. Some testimonies and videos even show Moroccan authorities escorting people towards the enclave’s border.
Of course, this doesn’t prove that Morocco deliberately facilitated the crossings – and the government has denied it. But a movement of this scale would have been difficult if Moroccan authorities were controlling the border as usual.
This reveals the broader problem with externalisation, in Morocco, Libya, Tunisia, Turkey and elsewhere: the EU finances border control but it can’t – and often chooses not to – check how these controls are conducted.
More externalisation – including through return hubs – both worsens the EU’s dependence on third-country governments by giving them greater leverage and exposes people to more violence and danger.
United by fear… divided by everything else
Ceuta’s political exploitation has extended well beyond Spain’s relationship with Morocco. In the US, Elon Musk, Vice-President JD Vance and the Department of Homeland Security used the events to attack Sánchez’s migration policies. These reactions come amid existing tensions between Washington and Madrid over NATO spending and Spain’s stance in the Iran conflict.
Israeli officials have likewise used Ceuta to reinforce their ongoing dispute with Madrid over Gaza and the recognition of Palestine.
Ultimately, Ceuta has become a pretext more than a debate: disinformation and fear-mongering obscure the reasons of the crossings and the restrictive policies that made such a dangerous route appear to be the only viable option.
The reactions within the EU have shown how readily political fears surrounding migration – long cultivated by those now instrumentalising them – can divide the Union.
Rather than confronting the conditions that led people to enter the water and at least 88 of them to die – including the EU’s own restrictive migration policies – political leaders leveraged Ceuta to attack their opponents, weaken Schengen, promote further externalisation and fuel unrelated disputes.
Accessible pathways and genuine solidarity would remove much of what made Ceuta possible – and much of what made it useful to others. The interior ministers meeting on 4 August discussed the opposite, unfortunately.
About the author:
Davide Colombi is a Researcher in the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) Unit at CEPS.