In short
- European land forces are rebuilding after decades of underinvestment, yet significant capability gaps are likely to persist until at least 2030. This report assesses three capability shortfalls in the Netherlands, Germany, Sweden and Denmark
- Although defence spending is increasing, progress remains constrained by limited defence-industrial capacity, lengthy procurement cycles and persistent personnel shortages
- In the absence of a coherent long-term strategy, Europe will remain reliant for critical capabilities such as long-range air defence and rocket artillery on non-European suppliers, as the United States and Israel
- Europe possesses the industrial and technological base to address these challenges, but doing so will require sustained political will, a coherent industrial strategy and deeper military cooperation
The international security environment in Europe has deteriorated significantly since the Russian Federation’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. This invasion marked a fundamental rupture with the post-Cold War security order and demonstrated that large-scale, high-intensity conventional warfare has returned to the European continent.
Russia’s sustained use of long-range fires, missile strikes, manoeuvre formations, and unmanned aerial systems (UAS) has underscored the renewed relevance of land forces and exposed critical capability gaps across European armed forces.
Challenges for the Netherlands
For the Netherlands, this deteriorated security environment has direct and tangible consequences. While various European intelligence agencies are warning that Russia could be fully prepared for a large-scale, conventional war against NATO by around 2030, the Netherlands is currently increasingly being exposed to hybrid threats and grey-zone activities as well. The Netherlands’ geographic position as a logistical hub for NATO reinforcement and host-nation support makes it a highly likely target in the event of a wider conflict. These developments place renewed demands on the Dutch armed forces, including its land forces.
A European response?
In response to these challenges, Europe faces the strategic imperative to rapidly scale up military capabilities. Years of underinvestment, force reductions, and expeditionary-focused force structures and training have left many European armies insufficiently prepared for high-intensity conflict. Since 2022, European governments have announced substantial increases in defence spending, force expansion initiatives, and ambitious modernisation programmes. The most prominent effort in this regard has been the 2025 The Hague NATO summit conclusion of setting a renewed annual alliance member state spending target of a total of 5% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP).
However, scaling the military is not merely a question of budgetary growth – it also requires informed prioritisation, doctrinal adaptation, and the efficient development of capabilities that address the most pressing operational shortfalls. For smaller and medium-sized armed forces, such as those of the Netherlands, learning from the experiences and choices of comparable, like-minded countries is therefore of crucial importance.
A comparative analysis
Against this backdrop, based on a multi-methods approach of desk research and semi-structured interviews, this paper assesses the progress being made in closing critical capability shortfalls of the land forces of three close NATO allies and the Netherlands itself. This endeavour is founded on the following research question: What capability shortfalls exist in selected European land forces, and how are these shortfalls being addressed? The three studied allies (Denmark, Germany and Sweden) are selected on terms of geographical proximity, comparative force structures and industrial cooperation and integration.
By examining how these European allies address and close capability gaps, the Netherlands can gain insight into alternative force development paths, trade-offs, and best practices. Countries with similar threat perceptions, alliance commitments, and industrial constraints may nonetheless pursue different solutions in areas such as force structure, procurement strategies, or capability prioritisation. Understanding such differences can help inform Dutch decision-making as it seeks to strengthen its land forces.
Four nations and three capability shortfalls
The report focuses on three critical capability shortfalls which stand central to NATO’s collective defence posture. The first is Ground-Based Air Defence (GBAD), which is essential for protecting manoeuvre units, critical infrastructure, and logistics against aerial threats such as missiles, aircraft, and unmanned systems. The second capability area is Land Fires, encompassing heavy fires such as 155mm artillery and rocket artillery capabilities that enable deep strike operations. The third capability area is Land Manoeuvre Formations, referring to armoured and mechanised units capable of conducting sustained offensive and defensive combat operations under contested conditions. Denmark, Germany, Sweden and the Netherlands have all embarked on significant defence reforms since 2022, yet all approach capability development from a distinct political, industrial, and doctrinal starting point. The report is supplemented with an appendix on innovation, examining the role of innovation across the three assessed capability areas, highlighting its relevance for addressing identified gaps.
About the authors:
Bart van den Berg is the Programme Lead of the Clingendael Security and Defence Programme.
Youri Verschoor is a researcher at Clingendael’s Security Unit, primarily working on the institute’s Security & Defence Programme.