The last time I visited Russia, in May 2019, I heard people close to the Kremlin talk about ‘two Wests’: the liberal West that focused on international law, human rights, multiculturalism and multilateralism, and the realist West that emphasised Judeo-Christian civilisation, ethnic homogeneity, family values and diplomacy led by great powers. My interlocutors had no doubt as to which version of the West was on the rise.
Afterwards I wrote a piece – for the New Statesman – about what I had picked up in Moscow. “Much of the Kremlin’s self-confidence stems from the belief that the Western world is changing in ways that suit Russia. Trump [then in his first term as US president] is seen to represent a long-term trend in the US rather than a short-term blip: Russian analysts reckon that the US will be less focused on intervening around the world to uphold a rules-based, US-led order, and that it will be more nationalist, mercantilist and interest-focused. So in the long run the US and Russia should be able to accommodate each other.”
The Russians I spoke to also thought that Europe was undergoing a similar transformation. “The successes of Viktor Orbán, Marine Le Pen, Nigel Farage and Matteo Salvini herald a new Europe that, like Russia, will seek to sustain family values and Christianity, while confronting Islamic extremism. Chastened by its foolish support for democracy in places like Libya and Syria, this Europe will not fuss much over human rights. Russians note that Trump and Putin share an illiberal world view that values the pursuit of national interest and disdains multilateralism.”
I also reported on the warmth of the Moscow-Beijing relationship. “Putin’s friendship with Xi Jinping, and the fact that Russia and China are probably closer than at any previous time in their history, reinforces the self-confidence in Moscow.”
Since then, Russia has launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine (in February 2022) and Trump has returned to the White House (in January 2025). I was reminded of that trip to Moscow when the White House published its National Security Strategy (NSS) in December 2025. Much of the Russians’ analysis in 2019 was reflected in the NSS; no wonder the Kremlin welcomed its publication.
The NSS does not see Russia as a threat to Europe. But it does chastise the EU for “undermin[ing] political liberty and sovereignty… creating strife, censorship of free speech and suppression of political opposition.” It says ending the war in Ukraine is important but does not criticise Russia for starting the war. It implies the Europeans are guilty of prolonging the war by aiding Ukraine.
The NSS – echoing Russian analysts – states that Europe faces “civilisational erasure” due to low birthrates, excessive immigration and loss of national identity. It highlights a perceived risk of European countries becoming majority non-European, by which it presumably means non-white. It expresses support for the far-right parties in Europe which claim the EU is eroding political freedom and sovereignty. Regarding transatlantic relations – including the NATO military alliance – as transactional, the NSS says nothing about the shared values which many Europeans believe bind the Western allies together.
Since the Centre for European Reform opened its first office in 1998 – at the high point of globalisation – Europe has faced a series of massive challenges: Islamic terrorism, long-running wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the financial crisis, the eurozone crisis, a surge of immigrants in 2014-16, Covid, the Ukraine war and its impact on energy prices. But the combination of threats that the EU faces in 2026 is the most serious in its history. Five of the most important are tangled up together:
Europe’s relative economic decline weakens its global standing and ability to pay for strong defence.
The growing success of far-right parties in Europe undermines the legitimacy, strength and credibility of the EU.
Russia is a real military threat, at least to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.
China’s new economic model, focused largely on export growth, threatens swathes of European industry.
The US can no longer be relied upon to guarantee Europe’s security.
This essay examines these threats, but concludes with some reasons why Europe’s future may not be entirely dark.
About the Authors:
Charles Grant helped to found the Centre for European Reform in 1996. In January 1998 he left The Economist to become the CER’s first – and so far only – director.
Ian Bond has been the deputy director of the Centre for European Reform since November 2023.
Elisabetta Cornago is assistant director of the Centre for European Reform, where she works on EU energy and climate policy from an economics perspective.
Sander Tordoir is chief economist at the Centre for European Reform. Sander works on eurozone monetary and fiscal policy, the institutional architecture of EMU, European integration as well as Germany’s role in the EU.
Zselyke Csaky is a senior research fellow at the Centre for European Reform. Her work focuses on EU institutions, elections, rule of law and democracy.