During the Hague NATO summit contributing nations decided to ‘allocate at least 3.5% of GDP annually to resource core defence requirements and to meet the NATO Capability Targets’.
But why are we measuring performance based on spending percentages of the GDP? Shouldn’t we focus on the measurement of capabilities? It seems that most European NATO-countries are ramping up spending in a linear, incremental manner. More of the same, with more modern equipment, primarily based on the existing concepts and assumptions. That will not necessarily make us deter to enter or win future wars.
Spending 800 billion euro on the European ReArm ambition should make us mindful to the fact that taxpayers’ money will not be spent on healthcare, education or housing, or that it may result in increased debts for future generations. We are therefore obliged to get the best bang for our buck.
Within the military, to measure a force’s might in relation to the resources spent, it is common to compare combat troops and supporting personnel, working in either headquarters, administrative, logistical, and life support. This is called the tooth-to-tail ratio.
Solely adding funds, will not necessarily repair a poor tooth-to-tail ratio, which seems painfully true for European NATO-countries. As EU Commissioner Andrius Kubilius repeatedly puts it: “450 million Europeans should not be begging 340 million Americans to protect Europe from 140 million Russians who cannot take on 38 million Ukrainians’’.
In the Netherlands, there are less than 44,000 active servicemen to command, of which only 8,000 serve in combat roles. Additionally, a staggering amount of 25,000 of civilian personnel support the armed forces. Approximately, this results in a poor 1:8 tooth-to-tail ratio.
The Dutch example is no exception as Europe’s NATO countries together employ 1.4 times more personnel than the United States, while still generating less combat power. Discussions on a potential European-led mission into Ukraine proved to be a wake-up call. Europe was unable and unwilling to deploy troops in sufficient numbers without an American backstop.
Admittedly, there are some issues with the tooth-to-tail ratio to determine the efficiency of armed forces. Still, the infamous ratio and its increase are usually defended by three arguments.
Firstly, technological advancements call for an increasingly larger tail, since maintenance of equipment is more complicated, and more ICT-skills are needed to install and sustain complex military networks.
Secondly, technological equipment may need more tail, but the few teeth we get in return are more lethal.
Thirdly, combat troops cannot fight without logistics, directions from HQ, life-support and even administration services. Like a boxer, to generate a punch, it needs the arm, the shoulder, the brains, the legs, basically the whole body.
Let’s deconstruct these routine arguments. Starting with the first, technological advancements may warrant a larger tail, but there are also opportunities to decrease the tail. Faster intelligence dissemination, using (semi)automated sensors, automated sensor-integration based on small AI-models, all-source analysis based on Large Language Models and Generative AI should result in improved decision-making quality and speed. This in turn would warrant flattening the chain of command and reducing HQ sizes considerably, pushing down resources and information to allow for a more bottom-up approach to plan and execute missions.
Secondly, technology may indeed provide fewer, but more lethal teeth. Arguably, only measuring combat troops versus non-combat troops can generate a distorted picture of military effectiveness. Perhaps we should rethink the tooth-to-tail ratio and compare combat soldiers to unmanned and autonomous vehicles – air, ground and sea – which add to firepower or logistics. Military labour productivity could also be regarded as the ratio of soldiers to the number of unmanned or autonomous vehicles in either combat positions, or logistics.
Thirdly, naturally any boxer will need its entire body to deal an effective blow. But this metaphor creates an oversimplification. The hypothetical professional boxer may be too heavy, while carrying not nearly enough muscle. He might have an expensive and contra-productive management, an enormous training staff and an outdated gym. As true as it may be that both boxers and soldiers alike, need a larger system, a context to facilitate excellence of performance, it does not mean that the wider system itself resembles forms of excellence. Probably it would make more sense to measure the efficiency of the supporting system itself.
Whether or not the tooth-to-tail ratio is an adequate metric, it offers a valuable insight to assess the efficiency of European defence budgets in terms of combat capability. Ultimately, linear and more spending, based on old assumptions and concepts, will neither generate better or more teeth, nor result in a smaller and more effective tail. To deter opponents to enter the ring in the first place or to knock them out when needed, we will need to achieve both.
About the Author
Erik Stijnman is an Army Lieutenant Colonel in active Dutch Service and has been seconded to Clingendael as Senior Research Fellow with Clingendael’s Security Unit.