On March 2, 2026, French President Emmanuel Macron gave a speech on nuclear deterrence policy at Île Longue , offering the first official announcement of an expansion of French nuclear deterrence to interested European allies, christened “forward deterrence” (Macron, 2026; Witney, 2026). European governments, particularly Berlin and Warsaw, have grown increasingly receptive to the idea that Paris could use its arsenal to safeguard the continent’s security. Even historically neutral Sweden held preliminary talks with France and the United Kingdom (UK) in January 2026 (Kayali & Barigazzi, 2026; van Hooft, 2025; Gibała, 2026).
This shift reflects major mutations in the global security environment. Since 2022, the return of large-scale conventional war in Ukraine, where Russia has used nuclear coercion to deter NATO support, has underscored the centrality of credible deterrence for European defence (Fraioli, 2026, p. 1; Bunde et al., 2026, p. 5; van Hooft, 2025). This threat is compounded by China’s expanding arsenal, the erosion of arms control regimes, and American strategic realignment toward the Asia-Pacific and Middle East (Fraioli, 2026, p. 1; van Hooft, 2025; Gibała, 2026). Though the Cold War-era American nuclear umbrella remains officially intact, President Trump has repeatedly cast doubt on the U.S. commitment to European defence (Gibała, 2026).
Facing this “deterrence deficit” (Fayet, 2026, p. 2), Europeans are seeking alternatives to complement NATO’s nuclear framework (van Hooft, 2025). A report of the European Nuclear Study Group identifies strengthening the role of British and French nuclear forces in European deterrence as the most credible of five policy options for continental deterrence (Bunde et al., 2026) . Macron’s speech thus responds to this changing landscape (Fayet, 2026, p. 1), aligning with the strategic autonomy, cardinal to recent EU policy (Keukeleire & Delreux, 2022, p. 162). This raises the question: does French “forward deterrence” represent a credible option for collective European security amid transatlantic uncertainty?
This paper first reviews the strategic implications of the doctrine of nuclear deterrence and its application to “forward deterrence”. It then assesses the credibility of such an initiative, an essential stake of deterrence that determines its efficiency. Finally, this paper underscores the various challenges that must be overcome for the initiative to be effective in practice.
About the author
Vincent Pennacchioni is a Defence & Security Research Trainee at Finabel.