Opinion & Analysis

Fridges to fighter bases: The rise in Iranian hybrid attacks in Europe

Iranian threats to European homeland security have grown over the past year as Tehran broadens its counter-strike options amid the US-Israeli war. A recent statement reportedly from Iran’s supreme leader warned the country would retaliate “without geographical limitation” if the US and Israel renew their strikes. In Europe, governments must therefore act now to prevent escalation by Iran. This article sets out the Iranian activity and likely motivations driving it, and proposes four main approaches for Europeans to reduce the possibility of further attacks.

The rise in Iranian-linked attacks in Europe

In recent months, Iran and its networks have faced accusations of directing attacks on European soil, including against military bases and critical infrastructure. Following a mass attack on commercial refrigerators in France this October, Paris charged Tehran with launching “the first cyber-offensive campaign carried out purely for sabotage purposes on national territory.”

In another high-profile case, this September a possible drone attack against the US base at RAF Fairford appears to have been foiled, after which the US withdrew its bombers (of the kind it had used to attack Iran). Like the French attribution, British prime minister Andy Burnham said Iran’s security apparatus was “almost certainly” behind the threats. While the RAF Fairford attack was derailed, in the early days of the US-Iran war this year, a British military base in Cyprus was hit by a drone most likely launched by the Iranian-backed group Hezbollah in Lebanon. This summer, Iranian hackers were also linked to a successful attack on a British power plant (in addition to water systems in the US).

Iran has not taken ownership of any of the incidents in Europe, and has decried some as “false flag” operations. However, it has threatened to strike US bases in Europe if they are employed to resume American attacks against it. The country has also stated it will effectively lift its self-imposed limit of using missiles beyond 2,000km—placing Europe within its reach. Altogether, the risk of different types of Iranian attack appears to be growing for Europe itself.

Why might Iran be stepping up attacks?

Iran has long been accused of directing attacks by criminal groups across Europe aimed at political dissidents or Jewish and Israeli targets. However, the targets in the past year appear to be connected to the war. This conflict is existential for Iran’s ruling elite and has likely raised the risk threshold for what Iran is willing to attack. In the past, Iran seemed wary of hitting targets in Europe that could be deemed “acts of war”—such as critical infrastructure or military bases—because of the harsh retaliation it could provoke.

But Iran is currently at war with two nuclear-armed powers that are openly seeking regime change, and so its calculations may well have changed. Through increased threats to Europe, Iranian decision-makers may be intending to deter and disrupt new waves of attacks, and even punish European capitals for their perceived complicity in the war. They could be hoping to deter renewed US-Israeli strikes by showing they can spread the war’s consequences beyond the Middle East, and potentially into Europe. From the start of this year, Iran has tried to make the pain of the conflict felt globally, for example by forcing energy prices up with attacks on refineries and vessels transiting the Strait of Hormuz. While Europeans have experienced the cost of the war in their pockets, these recent types of attack are spreading disruption to European homes.

Iranian attacks on military bases in the Middle East and Europe may also be attempts to disrupt America’s capacity not only to renew attacks but also to defend itself and allies. Tehran has partially achieved this by severely damaging US bases and radar systems in the region. Despite European governments’ efforts to keep a distance from the war, the US has been allowed to use bases across Europe (including in Italy, Britain and Bulgaria) to conduct war operations. The attempt at RAF Fairford could have been retaliation for the British government’s decision to assist with the “defensive” strikes against Iran. And statements by some political leaders have hardly served to set Europe apart from the conflict: the German chancellor described Israeli attacks as doing the “dirty work” on Europe’s behalf, and he predicted the days of the Iranian regime “are effectively finished”. Such statements were interpreted in Tehran as demonstrating support for the war.

Tehran may also view punishing Europeans for their perceived complicity in the war as relatively cost-free given relations between the two sides are at an all-time low. Sanctions have severely damaged trade. Political ties have been highly strained since the decision by France, Britain and Germany—the E3—in 2025 to snap back UN sanctions against Iran. With Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) designated as a foreign terrorist organisation by the EU in February, and the country already at war with the US, the group may now feel more comfortable launching high-stakes attacks in Europe.

Does Iran have the capability to cause major harm to Europe?

The reasons Iran may attack are clear. Yet there is a question over how much serious damage it could inflict on Europe given the number of foiled attempts.

Relative to the Gulf Arab countries, which have borne the brunt of Iranian drone and missile attacks, Europe’s geographical distance from Iran complicates strike capabilities. Iran may also lack both the capacity and ability to carry out attacks in faraway places, as these require sophisticated intelligence networks on the ground. It has made threats to kill American officials since the 2020 assassination of IRGC general Qassem Soleimani, but none has been carried out successfully. And, in the early weeks of this year’s war, Iran is believed to have unsuccessfully directed ballistic missiles towards the joint British-American military base in Diego Garcia. That being said, such attempts will have proved useful to Iran in terms of testing and learning for future escalations. Despite US and Israeli attempts to degrade Iranian missile capacities, Tehran’s attacks have also become more precise, such as those against US facilities in Jordan.

In addition, as the attacks on the British base in Cyprus, and refrigerators, power and water plants in the West, have shown, Iran is likely to advance its low-cost methods to keep testing Europe, including through cyberattacks, drones and criminal gangs. It needs only a handful of attempts to work to demonstrate it can be a present threat within Europe. But with so much critical infrastructure and so many important population centres, providing comprehensive defences in Europe is a costly and resource-intensive task. This mirrors the problem that Gulf Arab countries have faced when Iran and the Houthis have used cheap drones and missiles to target assets that cannot be adequately protected given the limited number of interceptors available.

There should also be concern that Iran and Russia will eventually combine intelligence and resource for conducting hybrid warfare in Europe. They have already showcased military cooperation in Syria, and in developing advanced drone technology. For Iran, this would be a tempting move, especially if the Kremlin helps it through intelligence sharing and boosting its military capacity in the war with the US and Israel.

What should Europe do?

European leaders should pursue four main approaches to prevent these threats from escalating.

Attribute responsibility, jointly and publicly

The EU and European countries like Britain, Norway and Switzerland should jointly (rather than individually) name and shame Iran in collective statements when responding to high-profile incidents, such as the refrigerator sabotage. They should then place targeted sanctions on the Iranian entities that orchestrated the attacks. As noted, Iran has not claimed responsibility for any of the attacks in Europe. This suggests it may be sitting on the fence about how far to go in Europe. Crucially, attribution and media scrutiny could provoke debate inside Iran over the costs and benefits of similar attacks. This may help create a shift in consensus in Tehran away from repeating such attacks, especially if Europeans steer clear of backing the US-Israeli war against Iran.

Demand an end to attacks, using private channels

Alongside this, Europeans should demand an immediate end to Iran’s hybrid attacks. They should do this through existing intelligence and security channels to the IRGC, clarifying red lines and setting out the repercussions of continued attacks. (The IRGC’s membership of the EU’s terrorist list does not equate to a no-contact policy.) At the same time, Europeans should activate political tracks with Tehran to advise that future such attacks will slow momentum from the new European and regional coalition (the so-called E4+R4), which is pushing for greater diplomacy with Iran. They can also threaten to recall ambassadors or shut embassies, as they did in 2011. European interlocutors should warn that Iranian attacks in Europe could change public opinion on the war, in favour of demanding action against Tehran.

Adopt a pan-European approach to hybrid attacks

Improved intelligence and counter-intelligence cooperation can help Europeans prepare for, and deter, Iranian hybrid attacks. This should include bolstering cyber defences for commercial actors. Europeans should also intensify cross-border rapid responses (akin, for example, to emergency responses to natural disasters) to better protect citizens in the event of cyberattacks on critical infrastructure.

Aim to reduce military tensions

Finally, European capitals should step up efforts to reduce military tensions between the US and Israel and Iran.

Countries such as Qatar and Oman have remained steadfast in their mediation role to end the war, despite coming under attack from Iran. Even Saudi Arabia, which has experienced intensive strikes from Iranian-backed groups in recent weeks, has rebooted diplomatic outreach with Iran, including with a meeting of senior military figures in Tehran. Europe’s partners in the Middle East, which have so far sustained real damage in the war, seem to recognise that the underlying causes of the conflict must be resolved if Tehran’s attacks against them are to cease. The recent meeting of the E4+R4 foreign ministers puts Europeans back on the high-level diplomatic track after a long absence. It offers a natural format to push for a process to permanently end the US-Iran conflict rather than be lured into facilitating potential renewed attacks.

About the author

Ellie Geranmayeh is a senior policy fellow and deputy head of the Middle East and North Africa programme at the European Council on Foreign Relations.

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