From economic giant to geopolitical powerhouse?

“They belong to us, they are one of us, and we want them in.” Commission President Ursula von der Leyen did not mince her words when discussing potential Ukrainian EU Membership on 27 February 2022, just days after the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Sharply contrasting were the remarks of then Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte two weeks later at the ad-hoc Paris summit: “EU accession of Ukraine is something for the long term, if at all.” While seemingly a mere political divergence, it in fact conceals fundamental questions of who is in charge of the EU’s external engagement and whether the EU can play a significant geopolitical role despite its fragmented distribution of power.

Such questions are not new. Already in 2009, the Treaty of Lisbon sought to strengthen the EU’s foreign policy capacity. First with the formalisation of the European Council (EUCO) as an official EU institution, including a permanent President. Lisbon also paved the way for the establishment of the European External Action Service (EEAS) in 2010. Yet the addition of two institutions did not solve the question of who to call to “talk to Europe” but rather made it more pressing. Informally, both the EUCO – and thus the Member States – and the Commission increasingly steer the EU’s geopolitical actions. Formally, however, the governance of these actions is scattered across multiple institutions.

When it comes to the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), Member States are at the helm. At the same time, the Union’s ‘foreign and security policy’ no longer encompasses only the CFSP and CSDP, as more and more Union policies include a geopolitical dimension. Policies and instruments in the area of economic security, such as the recently spotlighted anti-coercion instrument, provide an example. In other words, the demarcation line between the intergovernmental CFSP and CSDP on the one hand, and other supranational policies with a geopolitical dimension becomes increasingly blurred. This also obscures the division of competences between EU institutions.

These developments take place against the backdrop of a significantly changed world order to which the Union struggles to adapt. Nevertheless, the day-to-day governance in the Union is moving along and on occasions, it manages to take unprecedented steps. Examples are the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) (which was set up to help the EU recover stronger and more strategically independent from the COVID-19 pandemic), Ukraine’s and Moldova’s EU membership bids, and the recent steps towards enhanced defence cooperation. The 90-billion-euro joint loan to Ukraine could be another example, if Hungary ultimately decides not to block the proposal. Such groundbreaking steps are indeed often only possible by means of shortcuts to prevent vetoes, for example by using emergency legislation or by moving around unwilling Member States.

Such shortcuts have been both inevitable and necessary, but at the same time they disrupt the inter-institutional balance as envisaged in the Treaties. To restore this balance in a way that fits the Union’s geopolitical aspirations would, arguably, require a treaty reform that transfers powers to the EU institutions with associated checks and balances. However, such a treaty reform is unlikely to take place in the short term. Moreover, there are important differences in geopolitical interests between Member States. For example, France, due to its position in the UN Security Council, its significant defence industry and its possession of nuclear weapons, occupies a fundamentally different position than, for example, the Netherlands or Spain. As long as these differences exist, it may be undesirable for countries to be outvoted by (qualified) majorities.

This report therefore addresses the question of what the EU can do in the short term to enhance its geopolitically clout. What could be changed in the EU’s institutional architecture? And which less far-reaching interventions in daily institutional relations would ensure that decision-making in the EU evolves with the new geopolitical reality?

About the author:

Saskia Hollander is a Senior Research Fellow at the EU & Global Affairs Unit at Clingendael.

Wouter Zweers is a research fellow at Clingendael’s EU & Global Affairs Unit.