Bruce Byiers and Amanda Bisong present an alternative way of thinking about one-stop border posts in Africa. They argue for ‘why stop’ borders that require checks only for clearly identified reasons, relying on existing technology-driven solutions.
Across the continent, among development partners and governments, the general perception is that increasing numbers of one-stop border posts (OSBP) in Africa is a good thing. They help streamline cross-border trade and immigration processes which leads to reduced border transaction times and costs, thus lowering the cost of ‘thick’ borders. In a recent paper we asked ‘what it would take for a no-stop border in Africa?’, building on OSBPs.
The conclusion is that a no-stop, or ‘virtual’ border, is technologically feasible. Solutions exist for preclearance to take place online, which would allow certain drivers, vehicles and goods to proceed and cross the border without a stop, through a ‘green lane’. This would imply starting from an OSBP and slowly removing certain steps for certain actors.
But what if we adopt an alternative way of thinking? One where OSBPs are not the starting point for ‘no stop’ borders, but rather, building on digitalisation and greater risk-management based approaches, goods are only stopped if there is a specific reason?
Is the OSBP necessarily the first step to ‘no-stop’ borders?
OSBPs may be an important part of the journey towards ‘no-stop’ borders, however, they are not necessarily the first step, nor are they sufficient on their own to realise ‘no-stop’ borders.
One reason for new thinking about ‘no-stop’ borders is that some OSBPs are now becoming victims of their own success. In East Africa the Uganda Revenue Authority (URA) recently raised concerns over increasing traffic congestion at Malaba and Busia border posts with Kenya, urging the government to invest in infrastructure expansion to accommodate the growing trade activity. Paradoxically, the surge in traffic, and thus congestion, is due “to enhanced trade facilitation and relaxed conditions for establishing internal container depots (ICDs) and warehouses in Malaba, which have boosted local investment and job creation”.
But even for new OSBPs, large budgets are set aside for truck parking – that is, they work on the assumption that there will be congestion, with trucks being delayed and having to queue. The Nakonde OSBP upgrade between Tanzania and Zambia, supported by Trademark Africa, is focused on digitisation of clearance processes, cargo scanners and smart gates to cut dwell times for cargo trucks, but also “upgrade of road infrastructure within the OSBP and truck parking yard”.
Technology and no-stop borders
Increasingly, digitalisation of trade facilitation measures is seen as a key solution to high trade costs and times. But cross-border paperless trade measures remain “among the least implemented initiatives on the global and regional levels” due to “the inability to unilaterally implement such measures effectively”.
Digitising without addressing the questions of interests, needs and the actions of individuals will most often result in a situation where inefficiencies are transferred from paper processes to electronic transactions. Understanding the underlying interests of all stakeholders – governments, agencies, traders and civil society actors on both sides of a border is therefore key to designing trade facilitation interventions.
For border cooperation to work well, it requires simplified, aligned or harmonised regulations, but also political interests and incentives between states, between agencies and between specific actors that operate at and around borders, whether public, private or civil society actors. Traders and officials must simultaneously seek to comply with rules, regulations and payments. Since that is not always the case, full compliance is therefore really only one of multiple possible outcomes from a border exchange.
Similar incentive challenges arise for cross-border customs collaboration. Past work on the Dakar-Bamako Corridor highlighted how electronic customs connections between Senegal and Mali were being held back by the reluctance of Senegalese customs to forego some of these charges, including for physical escorts of trucks, even when those did not actually take place. The problem there, then, is less about technology or infrastructures, but the incentives in place to genuinely lower trade times and costs while retaining revenues.
Beyond that, while introducing electronic cargo scanners can strengthen the case for no-stop borders, counterintuitively, it can increase compliance costs faced by traders and offer an alternative for quick rents by government agencies and private concessionary companies. At the Beitbridge border in Southern Africa, waiting times increased as trucks queued to be scanned. Rather than spot checks of trucks based on risk assessment, all trucks were made subject to scanning, which, combined with poor physical planning, led to delays. So while cargo scanners could reduce trade times by limiting physical checks, not adopting a risk management approach to their usage arguably builds on a narrative that most, if not all, cargo is suspicious and should be checked, leading to scanning not on a risk-basis but comprehensively.
Indeed, there is an incentive to scan all traded goods, thanks to the scanning fee paid by shippers that essentially adds new rent-seeking activities at borders. A report by the Tripartite Free Trade Area (TFTA) and its Non-Tariff Barriers (NTBs) cites complaints about $100 charges and forced parking at a price of $30 at the Mutaka border in the DRC. These form part of a range of ‘ancillary charges’ that shipping companies cite alongside other border fees for cross-border trade to take place. Studies on trade and transport in Mozambique show how elites from FRELIMO, the political party in power successfully won bids to operate port scanners and provide services for which their companies did not have the requisite expertise, but provided fees of some $200 per container.
Beyond actual use, increased reliance on technological solutions, and thus private companies to provide them, raises questions about how contracts are awarded. Anecdotally, the move towards digitised border controls may be adding to rent-seeking at the borders and other checkpoints themselves through the procurement processes for technological solutions. Arguably, this could be more harmful to efforts to bring down trade times and costs if it builds in higher costs while compliance levels remain.
All of that raises the question of whether OSBPs are indeed the best starting point for thinking of a ‘no-stop’ border.
From ‘no stop’ borders to ‘why stop’ borders?
Beyond the above, building OSBPs is slow and costly, and arguably could delay ‘no-stop’ borders. As such, rather than starting from OSBPs where some requirements can be removed for some products at some borders, one might ask: why stop at borders?
Much of the reason for stopping relates to revenues and controls. As a recent article by Tim Harford puts it: “tariffs are imposed at national borders not for economic reasons but because national borders are an administratively convenient place to do so”. Work on ‘roadblock politics’ in Africa discusses how “anyone with a claim to power flocks to trade routes” in search of revenues, where indeed “roadblocks finance the exploits of many Central African armed groups”. Although border procedures also cover migration, security, (illegal) national resource management and food safety aspects – often with their own fees – these too can be addressed through technology-driven solutions.
The reversal of logic towards a ‘why stop’ approach faces some conceptual challenges – not least in terms of securing markets. Nonetheless, with effective risk management approaches, a ‘why stop’ approach could be used to stopping goods only for clearly identified reasons, such as specific risk indicators or random checks, rather than by default. This would rely on advanced risk assessments, pre-clearance and electronic payments, allowing seamless flow of trade, especially within a customs union. Tools like electronic cargo information systems, Authorised Economic Operator programmes, interconnected customs IT platforms and corridor-based cooperation can all provide the necessary eco-system and are supported by World Customs Organisation instruments such as the Revised Kyoto Convention, SAFE Framework and SMART Borders.
To move to a ‘why-stop border’ requires governments to balance several interests, including protecting revenue, maintaining border security, aligning with international standards (e.g WTO TFA & AfCFTA), improving efficiency and promoting economic competitiveness. Since the necessary digital infrastructure and institutional frameworks exist, governments should focus not only on time and cost reductions, but also on improving revenues and enabling industrialisation through increased investment and smoother cross-border trade.
And here, the gains as foreseen under the AfCFTA and existing FTAs, could be huge. So then, ‘why stop’ trade?
About the Authors
Dr Bruce Byiers is the associate director of ECDPM’s sustainable and inclusive economic development cluster. He is also a member of the management team.
Amanda Bisong is a senior policy analyst in ECDPM’s migration and mobility, Africa economic integration, and AU-EU relations teams.