Merz’s trip is less a bilateral tour than a signal setting moment: his words and stance will influence whether Europe pivots to a more assertive China strategy or lets Beijing lock in a costly status quo
China will try to use German chancellor Friedrich Merz’s trip to Beijing on February 24 to bolster a narrative of “stability” amid turbulence unleashed by US president Donald Trump. Since Canadian prime minister Mark Carney’s trip last month, the message has been simple: countries are “pragmatically” turning to China as their relationship with the US worsens. One of Beijing’s goals is to freeze the status quo with countries it fears may act more forcefully against China’s vast export surpluses.
The onus is on Merz to flip the narrative. He should make clear that China’s excess capacities, willingness to weaponise dependencies, and backing of Vladimir Putin are the real sources of instability for the German economy and European security. A pragmatic approach involves unwinding excessive reliance on Chinese supply chains, securing Europe’s industrial base and addressing critical security vulnerabilities.
The chancellor arrives in Beijing having spelled out in recent speeches that Europe should push back against coercion and reduce its dependencies. But he lacks a plan to address Europe’s de-industrialisation caused by Chinese imbalances and non-market practices. Freezing the political status quo with the US buys time for Europe to build up its own military capacities. Freezing it with China comes at a daily cost in lost jobs, slower economic growth and the hollowing out of competitive industrial sectors.
Solution
This problem will not be solved during the Merz’s visit alone, but his trip can help set the political preconditions for progress.
First, on his return, Germany should push for a comprehensive “level playing field” package as a central part of Europe’s competitiveness agenda. The EU already has a range of useful initiatives in motion: the Industrial Accelerator Act, the economic security doctrine, a growing list of Foreign Subsidies Regulation investigations, tightened customs rules and renewed debates on more sweeping trade defence measures. However, they are scattered across different silos. These initiatives need to be pulled together into a more coherent plan and paired with a broader European China strategy if they are to work at the speed and scale required.
Second, Europe must informally coordinate with other major economies that are in the same boat. Diversifying trade partners will have limited benefits if European firms face the same unfair Chinese competition in third markets. Aligning approaches to trade defence, procurement, consumer subsidies and economic security in strategic sectors with like-minded partners will do more for European firms than another round of free-trade agreements.
Third, Merz should signal a red line to Xi: Europe will defend its industrial future, and will use the anti-coercion instrument if Beijing tries to block it. European leaders have voiced concerns about the unsustainable status quo in past visits to Beijing, but they have failed to follow through. Merz now has a chance to reassert European credibility by matching rhetoric with concrete action.
Context
China’s state‑backed industrial model has monopolised global value chains worldwide and squeezed German manufacturing. Merz’s visit, his first since becoming chancellor, comes amid transatlantic tensions and Beijing’s attempts to portray itself as a partner more reliable than Washington. Against this backdrop, Merz’s trip is less a bilateral tour than a signal‑setting moment: the message he delivers in Beijing will influence whether Europe pivots to a more assertive China strategy or allows economic drift to continue.
About the Author:
Andrew Small is the director of the Asia programme at the European Council on Foreign Relations, based in the Berlin office.