The Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) is nearing its 50-year anniversary in 2025 in a Europe that is neither secure nor prone to effective cooperation. This presents a natural occasion for contemplating the organisation’s past and potential future paths.
Historical Analysis
The OSCE’s history can be subdivided into roughly three time periods: the Cold War Détente (1970s – early 1980s), normative and geopolitical convergence (late 1980s-1990s), and a period of growing crisis in the relations between Russia and the West (from the 2000s onwards). During the Cold War Détente, in an era of cautious political will to reach workable agreements, especially concerning the most prioritised (hard security) questions, the OSCE’s precursor, the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), showed that it can play a positive, facilitating role provided that the main actors have a genuine political will to attain tangible results. This can then lead to bigger openings on other issues of importance.
In the 1990s era of rapprochement, with the major actors driven by practical as well as ideological motives to seek better understanding, the OSCE experienced its greatest empowerment. The political goodwill on either side of the (former) divide catapulted the organisation into action, providing fertile ground for expanding its activities, mandates and organisational structure. Finally, from the late 1990s/ early 2000s onwards, there has been a clear diminution of the OSCE’s role that went in parallel with the deteriorating relationship between Russia and the West. The OSCE fell victim to its consensus-based foundation, allowing obstructionist actors – mainly, but not limited to, Russia – to hold the organisation hostage not just in terms of projects and initiatives, but also, at times, its very functioning. Yet again, the OSCE’s effectiveness proved a function of the political will of its participants to cooperate.
Three scenarios
Using this historical background as inspiration, this paper presents three potential scenarios for the future of the OSCE and the consequences, in each scenario, for the organisation’s effectiveness in implementing its tools and achieving its goals.
In scenario 1, Containment and Confrontation, the war in Ukraine drags on as an active military conflict, with neither of the parties managing to achieve a convincing victory, or willing to begin negotiations. The standoff between Russia and the West intensifies and reaches its full force. The OSCE’s decision making is mostly paralysed because of the entrenched and extreme differences between the two camps, and is unable to effectively use most of its instruments. It however continues to be a unique regional platform that brings together all conflicting parties, thus retaining the potential of informal encounters which, while difficult to gauge in terms of concrete impact, may still open up space for more meaningful communication in the long(er) term.
In scenario 2, Détente 2.0, after a prolonged conflict, the war in Ukraine is a quagmire of static frontlines and war fatigue is rife in both Russia and the West. As motivation for armed conflict ebbs, some space emerges for communication and cooperation on a limited number of issues that both Russia and the West prioritise: mainly hard security and arms control. The OSCE can reinvigorate its role as a platform for and a facilitator of contacts and dialogue, at least on those questions. The OSCE is also well placed to conduct any monitoring activities that may result from these discussions, should the parties reach any agreements. Activities within the human dimension, while not realistic in the Russian context, are still possible in relation to third countries that wish to work in this direction. As part of the human dimension, the civil societies of various participating states can still pay an important role in relevant activities and dialogues.
In scenario 3, in an unexpected turn of events, President Putin is replaced by a new leadership that is highly motivated to undo the biggest damage to Russia’s economic and geopolitical standing as a result of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, or even launch Russia’s return to the OSCE commitments. The regime softens in all directions, and creates an opening for talks on Ukraine in a purely pragmatic bid to bring some kind of resolution that would allow for the Western sanctions to be lifted. With a genuine will on both sides to reach tangible results, the OSCE is reinvigorated. It is better able not only to engage in more effective decision-making, but also to restart normative discussions on the future of the European security architecture and the values of the Helsinki Final Act.
About the Authors
Marina Ohanjanyan is a Senior Research Fellow at Clingendael’s Security Unit, focusing mostly on the developments in and surrounding Russia and Eastern Europe.
Bob Deen joined the Clingendael Institute as Senior Research Fellow and team leader on Security and Defence since March 2020. He is the Coordinator of the Russia and Eastern Europe Centre.
Kaspar Pucek is a Research Fellow within the Security Unit and the Russia & Eastern Europe Centre (CREEC) at the Clingendael Institute.