Summary
- Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the EU has offered a membership perspective to Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova.
- This gives the bloc new potential to resolve or stabilise “frozen conflicts” in eastern candidate states.
- The breakaway and occupied regions of Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transnistria are undergoing a process of de facto annexation by Russia.
- The EU should draw up a policy to deal with Russian annexation actions, prevent Moscow from effectively vetoing candidates’ accession, and embed this in its evolving approach towards Russia.
New policy for new times
For many years, the EU has lacked a coherent strategy for addressing security and political challenges arising from protracted conflicts in countries to its east. But since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the bloc has gained the ability to play a meaningful role in addressing such challenges, including in Abkhazia in Georgia and in Transnistria in Moldova. However, it has not yet capitalised on this, or perhaps even understood the extent of its newfound potential.
As part of its response to Russia’s war, the EU made offers of membership to Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia. In this transformed context, enlargement could, once again, become a key geopolitical instrument for the bloc. Yet, granting membership perspectives to countries at war, and with territories occupied or effectively controlled by Russia, requires an integration path that extends beyond the Copenhagen criteria—the official conditions necessary to join the bloc, which were developed in a very different era. Russia retains the capacity to destabilise these countries through its influence in these territories. This means that eastward enlargement will confront the EU with unprecedented challenges. It also comes at a time when American reluctance to act as a security guarantor in Europe complicates the EU’s efforts to ensure regional stability and resolve conflicts—though it may also catalyse a greater EU role in security and crisis management on the continent.
So far, the bloc’s approach to these regions remains fragmented and reactive. The EU and its member states tend to treat these conflicts as secondary security concerns (except for Ukrainian regions where war is raging). They have also played a cautious role in international mediation formats dedicated to these conflicts.
This policy brief examines the EU’s role in resolving conflicts in breakaway and occupied territories within eastern candidate countries. In particular, it looks at the current situation in Abkhazia to warn that Russia is gradually annexing the region—an act that could entrench Moscow’s influence even more deeply. The paper explores the lessons learned from the EU’s past engagement with these territories and countries, and offers recommendations for a more effective strategy. It draws on desk research and interviews with conflict experts, EU officials and representatives from the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the European Commission.
The paper argues the EU should draw up a strategy that directly accounts for the breakaway and occupied regions of Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transnistria as part of eastern candidate countries’ membership journey. Alongside this, the EU and its member states will need to become more assertive partners, acting independently of the United States, the United Nations, the OSCE and potentially even NATO when it comes to dealing with these territories. The EU should aim to counterbalance Russia in the occupied regions and move firmly away from the “caution first” imperative that guided European policy towards Russia for most of the last 30 years. It must offer local populations a tangible, attractive European-led alternative, making clear that these regions have a future in the EU as part of Georgia and Moldova—and that this way forward heralds the security, prosperity and dignity that Russia can never provide.
Russia’s influence
The EU’s decision to grant membership perspectives to Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 created a historic opportunity—not only for these countries’ European integration but also for the prospect of resolving long-term conflicts in their occupied or breakaway regions. EU membership is a powerful incentive for reform, stability and reconciliation. For Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transnistria it could even help reshape the political and economic realities of these territories and could fundamentally alter their relations with central governments.
Yet something is missing: the EU’s accession process lacks a roadmap dedicated to addressing protracted conflicts in breakaway and occupied territories in candidate countries. The bloc must tackle this, first to prevent the unresolved status of these regions from scuppering applicant countries’ accession. Second, the EU will want to minimise the opportunity for Russia to exploit its presence and influence in these regions, including making sure to deny Moscow an effective veto over these states’ accession to the EU. Finally, the bloc must place policy towards these regions and countries within its broader strategic approach to Russia.