Not since the end of the Second World War have there been more armed conflicts than there are today. War, violence, displacement and hunger are shaping the lives of an ever-increasing number of people worldwide.
The Horn of Africa is a global conflict flashpoint. Some of the deadliest armed conflicts of the past decade have taken place or are continuing to take place there: the civil war in South Sudan, the power struggle in northern Ethiopia and the war against the civilian population in Sudan. Estimates suggest that since 2013, more than 1 million people have died in those wars as a consequence – direct or indirect – of violence, hunger and deprivation. Moreover, the war in Sudan has triggered the world’s largest displacement crisis.
At the same time, the current system of international conflict management, in which the United Nations (UN) and regional organisations are the key players, has come under severe strain. After the end of the Cold War, there emerged an international “standard approach” towards dealing with armed conflict – particularly civil wars. That approach includes i) coordinated mediation based on applying both pressure and expertise; ii) an agreement between the main parties to the conflict to share political and economic power and restore the state monopoly on the use of force; and iii) an international implementation structure that has diplomatic support and, in many cases, a multidimensional peace mission. While this has always been an ideal model, many examples of such an approach can be found in the Horn of Africa, in particular.
In South Sudan, there are several international organisations that take various approaches to conflict management: the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS); a body that reports to the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and monitors the revitalised peace agreement; and the committee of five African Presidents (C5) within the African Union (AU). In Sudan, the United Nations – African Union Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) remained in place until the end of 2020. Five international organisations – the UN, the AU, IGAD, the European Union and Arab League – are involved in seeking to end the war that broke out in April 2023 between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). Also involved are the US and various Arab and European states. However, coordination between all these actors is limited. In Ethiopia, under the internationally backed Pretoria Agreement, concluded in November 2022 by the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and Addis Ababa, only a tiny AU observation mission is present. In the case of all three countries, the US, together with its European and regional African partners, has played a leading role in mediating, exerting pressure and providing support.
However, the availability of such conventional instruments of conflict management is dwindling. The UN Security Council frequently fails to reach a political consensus, while there have been no new multidimensional peace missions since 2014 and the aim of mediation efforts is now limited to achieving ceasefires. The resources, patience and leadership to drive subsequent political processes are all lacking among the earlier proponents of the standard approach towards dealing with conflicts, particularly the US.
For the most part, the international conditions and assumptions underpinning this approach are no longer being met. The US has ceased to be the sole hegemonic superpower; rather, there are rival powers that act within shifting arrangements of cooperation. The normative ideals of a “liberal” or at least sustainable peace are finding less support, not only in the US but also in Europe; indeed, it is not unusual for programmes promoting inclusion and diversity to be confronted with downright hostility. Even former advocates of an active international role in conflict management are frustrated by the setbacks in Afghanistan, Mali and Sudan as well as by what they perceive, at least, as the ineffectiveness of corresponding peace efforts elsewhere.
In fact, even relatively comprehensive and inclusive peace agreements have fallen short of expectations when it comes to their practical implementation. At times, they have even contributed to consolidating authoritarian and violent systems. For elites vying for dominance in the state, the economy and society, political violence remains the means of choice in such cases.
Thus, in the Horn of Africa, there is a multifaceted crisis in international conflict management: at the level of the international order, at the level of multilateral institutions and at the level of the political economy of the countries concerned.
This research paper examines the development of this polycrisis in international conflict management through the lens of major conflicts and peace processes in Sudan, South Sudan and Ethiopia. It seeks to answer the question of how such a situation came about at both the global and regional level. While the second Trump administration has exacerbated the crisis-prone trend, the current White House occupant has not caused it. The research paper also examines the approaches to conflict management that have been adopted in the three countries since the conclusion in 2005 of Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement, which, at the time, many involved in the mediation discourse regarded as exemplary, although its weaknesses are now blatantly evident. Finally, the paper takes a look at what the crisis means in practice for mediation and peace processes in Sudan, South Sudan and Ethiopia.
Germany has invested heavily – both financially and politically – in the multilateral system of conflict management and has benefited from the relative achievements of that system. The Federal Republic’s claim to a seat on the UN Security Council is derived precisely from this commitment to peace, international law and international security. Its export-oriented economy requires a rules-based international order that ensures compliance with such fundamental principles as territorial integrity. Further, European security depends on domestic conflicts in other regions of the world not spreading, whether through terrorism, organised crime or attacks on shipping. And freedom in Germany relies not least on an international system in which egregious violations of international law are, at a minimum, recorded and condemned rather than explicitly or tacitly condoned when a country’s own partners are involved. The crisis in conflict management in the Horn of Africa thus strikes at the very foundations of German foreign policy.
Germany must decide whether it wants to contribute to this crisis by continuing to cut international cooperation budgets and exercise normative restraint or whether it intends to take a proactive role in seeking new ways to end conflicts and foster peace. To this end, it will be important not to be hoodwinked by transactional, profit-oriented mediation approaches. Rather, Berlin should support – at least as a complementary measure – local initiatives aimed at social cohesion, ceasefires and reconciliation. It should also analyse Germany’s own transnational ties with conflict actors and lobby for greater accountability.
About the author
Dr Gerrit Kurtz is Associate in SWP’s Africa and Middle East Research Division.