This policy brief examines the changing nature of Serbia’s relationship with Russia and assesses its implications for the European Union. By analysing four domains – political relations, the economy and energy, security, and societal ties – it argues that the traditionally close Russian-Serbian partnership has seen growing friction and reduced intensity in recent years.
While neither side has fundamentally reversed course politically, growing tensions over energy – notably around Serbia’s national oil company NIS – and security have exposed a shift from a narrative of unconditional “Slavic brotherhood” towards a more transactional relationship. These developments place Serbia’s leadership on an increasingly narrow geopolitical edge between Russia, the EU, and other major powers, at a time of sustained domestic pro-democracy protests. The paper assesses that the EU has been partially responsive to both geopolitical and democratic developments in Serbia, but that it can take a more proactive role in the discussed domains based on strict democratic conditionality in support of its enlargement agenda.
“We hear one set of statements when he speaks in Moscow and another when he speaks elsewhere.”
This recent remark by Maria Zakharova, the spokesperson for the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, referred to Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić’s comments suggesting that he is indifferent as to whether Serbian-made weapons are reaching Ukraine. Her statement closely resembles the type of criticism EU diplomats frequently direct at Vučić – accusing him of a lack of commitment to Serbia’s EU accession requirements. Yet coming from Moscow, such a rebuke is remarkable.
For decades, Russia and Serbia have cultivated close political cooperation, rooted in a self-proclaimed “brotherly” relationship and a shared Slavic identity. However, Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 has reverberated well beyond the conflict itself. As we analyse in this ongoing series of Clingendael policy briefs, “one such consequence is […] a modification in Russia’s bilateral relations, including with countries it traditionally considered as allies”. Increasingly, Serbia may now be one such example.
Almost four years into Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, the Russian-Serbian relationship appears to be increasingly strained. Under pressure from U.S. sanctions, Serbia has sought to find a third-party buyer or even regain control over its national oil company NIS at the expense of the current majority owners Gazprom and Gazprom Neft. Moscow has expressed frustration over evidence of Serbian-produced weapons being used by Ukraine. This takes place against a backdrop of strong pressure on the Serbian government from domestic democratic protests and, increasingly, also from other powers like the US and the EU.
This paper examines the evolving relationship between Russia and Serbia and explores its meaning for the European Union. It considers four dimensions of the relationship: political, the economy and energy, security and defence and societal linkages. The paper then discusses implications for EU diplomacy towards Serbia and concludes with recommendations for European and Dutch policy makers. The analysis is based on desk research and a limited number of research interviews with experts and public officials.
About the Author:
Wouter Zweers is a research fellow at Clingendael’s EU & Global Affairs Unit.