Opinion & Analysis

Snap out of it: Europe, Iran and nuclear negotiations

The deadline is looming for Britain, France and Germany to decide whether to reimpose sanctions on Iran. They are right to consider an extension to this “snapback” mechanism—and China could play a crucial role in what comes next.

“Snapback” looks set to be the word of the summer in European negotiations with Iran. In October, United Nations Security Council (UNSC) sanctions on Iran’s nuclear activities—eased under the 2015 nuclear deal—are due to permanently end. Before this “termination date”, any country still party to the agreement (Britain, France and Germany, or the E3, as well as China and Russia) can unilaterally reimpose any of the eased sanctions. After October, the snapback mechanism will expire alongside the remaining sanctions.

The countdown to termination date follows June’s unprecedented, and what many analysts view as illegal, Israeli and US military strikes on Iran. To reduce the risk of another round of military conflict, Europeans will have to use snapback strategically to create the conditions for much needed diplomacy. One way of doing so would be to extend the termination date rather than lose snapback as a lever by using it or letting it expire. The E3 appear to have offered such an extension to Iran in recent days and are expected to restart negotiations on Friday. Now, they need a roadmap for how the extension might work and what goals they should aim to achieve in the time it affords them.

The October deadline: “Termination date”

Under the 2015 nuclear accord, Iran and world powers—then including America—agreed to “sunset” clauses that meant certain restrictions on Iran’s nuclear programme would expire over time. After October 2025, the Iran nuclear file would effectively be off the UNSC’s agenda. This was a crucial argument for Iran’s former president Hassan Rouhani to sell the deal domestically: after a decade of compliance, Iran’s civilian nuclear programme would be normalised on the global stage.

But the US withdrew from the deal in 2018 and reimposed sanctions on Iran. Subsequently, Iran’s nuclear activities increased. The E3 have long argued these activities exceed civilian requirements and risk moving toward weaponisation. Iran counters that it has the right to exceed the limits of the deal, claiming that after the US withdrawal the remaining parties failed to deliver on the promised economic benefits.

In theory, lifting the remaining UN sanctions would let Iran procure nuclear technology without international restrictions. Countries like Russia could thus increase their nuclear support to Iran. In practice, US sanctions—nuclear and non-nuclear—will continue to make other countries reluctant to assist Iran or to provide the dual-use technology it can use to advance its nuclear programme. Iran also remains bound by the UN non-proliferation treaty (NPT) to allow inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and is permanently barred from acquiring nuclear weapons.

About the author:

Ellie Geranmayeh is a senior policy fellow and deputy head of the Middle East and North Africa programme at the European Council on Foreign Relations.

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