Too many Europeans are quietly aligning with America and Israel’s war against Iran. Instead, they urgently need to pursue difficult diplomacy to halt a spiralling conflict that is significantly undermining European security and economic interests.
Europeans had weeks of notice that US president Donald Trump was about to trigger a war in the Middle East. The conflict is now wreaking carnage in the world’s most energy-rich region on an hourly basis, increasing the direct costs to Europeans and boosting Russia’s war coffers. But Europe’s collective response has been, at best, a fiasco—and at worst, strategic lunacy.
Europe on the sidelines
Instead of looking for ways to press Trump to end the conflict and help the region find a political off-ramp, several key European actors are cheerleading on the sidelines.
In sharp contrast to the principled stance from Spain, which has called it an illegal war devoid of an effective strategy, Germany has publicly said it will not “lecture” the US on international law (despite years of doing so on Ukraine). It is also actively supporting—as European Commission president, Ursula von der Leyen, initially did—Trump’s call for Iranian regime change.
Since the onset of fighting, European officials across the board have also focused on condemning Iran for its counter-retaliation, without reference to the US and Israel’s initiation of the war at a moment when Tehran posed no immediate threat. For their part, Britain and France are only hesitantly calling out the illegality of the US-Israeli attacks while steadily increasing material support for the operation.
Britain is now permitting the launching of direct “defensive” strikes into Iranian territory from its military bases. French president Emmanuel Macron described the attacks as “conducted outside of international law” but immediately downplayed this by suggesting that Iran’s tyrants had it coming. French bases are also now supporting US operations.
Defending regional interests
Europeans should of course defend their citizens and assets in the region. Drone attacks, apparently launched by the Lebanese group Hezbollah, have already targeted a British military base in Cyprus and Iran has hit a French base in the UAE. European governments should also support Arab countries to defend themselves by shooting down Iranian drones and missiles heading them.
But the E3 (Britain, France and Germany) risk getting sucked into a deeper conflict. Not only will Trump quickly demand more, but the use of European bases in support of US military operations exposes them to retaliatory strikes by Iran. This would risk accelerating “mission creep”—dragging Europe into a regime-change war that already has all the hallmarks of a catastrophe, given the lack of US strategic objectives and planning.
Europeans are understandably angered by Iran, given the relentless threats it has posed over recent decades. Most capitals would welcome a significant change in behaviour from the government in Tehran or even the collapse of the current regime, not least given the brutal killing of thousands of protesters in January 2026. But all evidence from recent Western military interventions in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya suggests regime change in Iran will be a highly costly endeavour. There is little guarantee of a successful transition to a better future which meets the needs of the Iranian people.
Europeans need to back the aspirations of the Iranian people to be freed from authoritarian rule. In these wartime conditions, Europeans should be helping Iranians get back online amid another internet shutdown and using their diplomatic presence in the country to press for the safety of political prisoners and minors detained after the recent protests. They should also work with NATO ally Turkey to ensure humanitarian assistance is available on the Iranian border for those who flee.
The Iran-Ukraine nexus
At the heart of the European strategy in Iran is a desire to keep “daddy” Trump happy. It is, in essence, just one dimension of Europe’s more important transatlantic policy—now the guiding star of European global positioning, with a singular focus on securing US support to ensure Russia’s defeat in Ukraine.
But this approach is strategically counter-productive. The US war on Iran will only weaken wider European ambitions in Ukraine—and Russia will be a key beneficiary. The surge in energy prices is set to benefit Vladimir Putin and the disruption to Qatari gas supplies, caused by Iranian strikes, will make Europe (and other global actors) more dependent on Russian energy supplies. Meanwhile, as the Kremlin’s bolstered war economy helps address Russia’s domestic economic woes and enables its armament programme, Western ammunition stocks and vital missile interceptors are being depleted in the Middle East.
Equally worrying is that Europeans are not opposing Trump and Putin’s clear effort to establish a world order organised by military might. Multiple US government leaks and comments from senior members of Congress briefed on the strikes make clear that there was no imminent threat posed by Iran.
Moreover, these attacks were—like when Israel initiated its US-backed 12-day war on Iran in June 2025—launched amid ongoing US-Iran talks where the mediator, Oman, claimed progress had been made with significant Iranian concessions. Supporting the US mission is a green light to support a world without even a residual attachment to a rules-based order. Europeans, as weak global actors, will pay a grave price for this down the line.
Increasing support for, and the heightened chance of European participation in, America and Israel’s illegal war also risks undermining Europe’s reputation at home (similarly, Trump is facing growing domestic opposition in the US). At a time when European governments are tightening their belts as defence spending increases, people will rightly question why their taxes are being spent on a war of choice.
If the conflict is prolonged, European households will directly feel the surge in energy prices and inflation, further emboldening populist groups looking to unseat incumbent leaders.
Asking difficult questions
“The bottom line is that it would be a huge strategic mistake for European actors to embrace Trump’s war in a bid to keep him happy on wider issues, notably Ukraine”
The bottom line is that it would be a huge strategic mistake for European actors, whether directly or implicitly, to embrace Trump’s war in a bid to keep him happy on wider issues, notably Ukraine. And European countries already backing strikes inside Iran need to clarify two questions for their populations.
First: how does Europe stop itself from being sucked into Trump’s regime-change war? Trump has now floated the idea of introducing ground troops, with reports suggesting the US and Israel are arming dissident Kurdish groups (with separatist ambitions that will agitate Turkey) which could mount a ground offensive. Given the current state of play, how far will Europe go at Trump’s behest?
Second: how will Europe respond to the fallout of a potential state collapse in Iran? Its territory and population vastly surpass those of Libya, Syria and Iraq; Iran becoming another failed state would create a dramatic humanitarian crisis and new migration flows towards Europe. No one should be under the illusion that Trump is invested in long-term stability in Iran, let alone the legitimate rights and needs of the country’s long-suffering population. Will German chancellor Friedrich Merz realistically pledge to support fleeing Iranians through humanitarian assistance and asylum, while also helping re-establish a functioning Iranian state?
Before European capitals plunge head-first into Trump’s reckless war of choice, they must be upfront with the hard questions. A wiser course of action would be for Europeans to invest heavily in diplomacy to pressure Washington and Tehran into a ceasefire and back to the negotiating table, with significant Iranian concessions. The death of Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, has given Trump enough to claim victory. Now Europeans must be clear that this war needs to end.
About the authors:
Julien Barnes-Dacey is the director of the Middle East & North Africa programme at the European Council on Foreign Relations.
Ellie Geranmayeh is a senior policy fellow and deputy head of the Middle East and North Africa programme at the European Council on Foreign Relations.