Opinion & Analysis

Strengthening EU economic security through ASEAN

Economic security in the EU is entering a more uncertain phase. For decades, the European Union (EU) benefited from open trade, predictable rules and the assumption that economic interdependence would remain largely separate from geopolitical rivalry. In fact, the EU was built around the fundamental belief that trade would cement peace in Europe.

That assumption has now collapsed. Events have shown how economic efficiency without resilience can become an expensive liability when geopolitical conditions change. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine exposed the risks of strategic dependence on Russian gas. China’s dominance of critical supply chains and manufacturing has created strategic vulnerabilities that increasingly threaten Europe’s industrial base. And a second presidential term of Donald Trump has made the United States a less predictable economic and security partner.

Europe’s response will not be full-on protectionism. But a more realistic approach to free trade is unavoidable. Diversification is an important part of such an approach. The EU needs more suppliers, markets, investment partners and production centres to reduce critical dependencies that can be used against it. This Clingendael Alert argues that deeper links to the ASEAN region are an obvious but underappreciated element in Europe’s quest for economic security. It goes on to offer a three pronged course of action for the EU to take.

ASEAN as part of the solution

The EU’s approach to economic security is essentially to remain open to international trade and investment, while reducing vulnerabilities that could be exploited for geopolitical purposes.2 A deepening of EU-ASEAN economic supply chains could be central to this effort.ASEAN represents more than 660 million people and is one of the world’s largest economic regions. It is already the EU’s third-largest trading partner outside Europe, with goods tradeworth almost €275 billion in 2025. European investment stocks in ASEAN exceed €360 billion.3A deepened EU-ASEAN economic partnership will not replace trade with China or the US. Yet,it will diversify Europe’s economic exposure and increase Europe’s resilience.

The strategic fit is particularly strong. First,ASEAN already has strong economic presence in strategic supply chains that are also critical for Europe’s economic security, including critical minerals mining and refining, semiconductors and electric vehicles.4 Second, deeper EU-ASEAN ties could contribute to ASEAN’s own objective to diversify supply chains. Its framework for supply-chain efficiency and resilience emphasises supplier diversification, supply-chain mapping,stockpiles, digitalisation and green logistics. This creates a convergence of interests.

European companies need alternatives to concentrated Chinese supply chains. ASEAN economies require investment, technology and access to European markets as they move up global value chains. And manufacturing industries in both EU and ASEAN will increasingly feel the pressure from China’s relentless pursuit to dominate most if not all manufacturing supply chains. Both sides therefore have an interest in building more diversified, resilient economic networks. The EU understands ASEAN’s potential,but so far is not showing the strategic resolve to capitalise on it. And in a divided ASEAN, the EU is widely considered a significant but second-tier player to the more aggressive China and United States.

About the author

Jan-Hein Chrisstoffels is a Senior Research Fellow at Clingendael, and previously served at the Netherlands Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Economic Affairs in a variety of roles at headquarters and abroad.

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