The 6G race will define the next digital order

The next generation of mobile technology will determine who controls the critical infrastructure on which modern economies, security systems, and democratic governance increasingly depend. The technical standards for 6G deployment are being negotiated now, with the first specifications expected by 2028, followed by implementation around 2030. Whoever shapes them will enjoy economic and strategic advantages for decades to come.

The 6G race is beginning earlier than the 5G race did – and is cutting deeper. With 5G, the politics centered on whether Chinese vendors such as Huawei could be trusted to build national networks. But rather than eliminating Huawei, pressure from Western security officials and others forced the company to adapt. Cut off from key Western components and markets, Huawei reorganized its supply chains, accelerated domestic innovation, drew on more state support, and emerged more vertically integrated and closely aligned with the Chinese government’s own strategic objectives.

With 6G, the struggle is not over suppliers, but over the technical blueprint itself. 6G cellular technologies are expected to embed AI and advanced computing directly into network architecture, enabling automation on a massive scale. With hundreds of billions of connected devices and the network itself functioning as a ubiquitous sensor and AI layer, vulnerabilities in design could have systemic consequences.

Standards therefore matter enormously. They will determine which technologies are embedded and which patents become standard-essential (mandatory for technical compliance), shaping long-term royalty flows and influence across the telecom ecosystem. Much of this work is taking place far from exhibition halls, but the momentum on display in Barcelona will feed directly into the negotiations.

Three power centers currently dominate the race. One is China, which brings formidable strengths, including more than 40% of global 6G-related patent applications and an unmatched pool of state-backed research capacity. Huawei, strengthened rather than weakened by the 5G confrontation, sits at the center of this ecosystem. With extensive state backing, it is uniquely positioned to operate across fragmented or parallel systems should global standards splinter. China also has invested heavily in international standardization bodies and continues to court countries in the Global South through infrastructure diplomacy.

The United States approaches 6G from a different position. Its technology firms capture much of the value generated by connectivity, even if they do not build radio networks. Yet the US remains dependent on non-American vendors, notably Ericsson and Nokia, for core hardware. Efforts to reshape the market through the Open Radio Access Network (which allows for multi-vendor interoperability) have had only a limited impact so far, though such initiatives are likely to resurface as 6G approaches.

In the meantime, the US might also promote alternative architectures – including satellite and software-defined systems – to expand its influence over the connectivity stack. Extending American dominance from cloud and AI services into the network layer would deepen existing dependencies, raising strategic questions for countries already reliant on US platforms and services.

Europe’s position is unusual. It is a laggard in many digital domains, but still the global leader in telecoms. Ericsson and Nokia are among the few companies capable of delivering complete radio access networks at scale. This industrial base gives Europe leverage few other regions possess. But it also could be a source of tension. Since European telecoms are deeply integrated into US supply chains and markets, those devising the European Union’s strategy cannot simply assume that their geopolitical ambitions and corporate incentives will remain aligned.

In any case, Europe is not sitting still. The European Commission has already moved to phase out Chinese vendors and promote 6G investment through regulatory reforms, signaling that it views connectivity as a strategic sector, rather than merely a regulated utility. But vulnerabilities remain. Europe’s dependence on Chinese equipment varies widely across EU member states, and operators still struggle to earn adequate returns on massive 5G investments. Faced with balance-sheet pressures, they may prefer incremental 6G upgrades layered onto existing infrastructure, rather than a transformative architectural shift.

Policymakers who speak of technological sovereignty must grapple with this economic reality. The risk is not that Europe lacks assets, but rather that it will fail to act coherently. European policymakers should focus on two imperatives.

First, advanced connectivity should be treated explicitly as a matter of economic security. Risk assessments of 6G architecture, AI integration, and supply-chain dependencies must come before these technologies are locked in. The vulnerabilities associated with 5G must not be replicated at a deeper architectural level.

Second, EU policymakers and European elected officials must align industrial policy and foreign policy. Closer transatlantic coordination on standards-setting, research funding, and reforms related to standard-essential patents would significantly strengthen Europe’s position in the emerging digital order. Infrastructure diplomacy, including support for trusted providers in third markets, will be decisive.

For emerging and developing economies, the stakes are equally high. Decisions made today will shape their debt exposure, technological dependencies, cybersecurity, and long-term industrial development paths for years to come. Connectivity choices will influence whether countries remain mere technology consumers, or whether they can gain leverage within the digital economy.

Digital sovereignty depends on infrastructure. The networks built over the next decade will carry the data that hospitals, power grids, military systems, and elections run on. Encouragingly, major industry players still appear committed to a single global 6G standard. Fragmentation would likely benefit those with strong state backing and vertically integrated supply chains – above all Huawei. But even with a shared standard, competition over patents, implementation, and market access will be intense.

The conversations in Barcelona will be only the visible surface of this contest. The decisive choices will be made by standard-setting bodies, investment boards, and policymaking agencies over the next few years. They will determine not just who leads in the connectivity sector, but who shapes the next digital order.

About the Author:

Björn Fägersten, a senior research fellow at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs, is CEO of the geopolitical consultancy Politea.