The EU Needs to Look for Opportunities for Pragmatic Engagement with Minsk
Despite the façade of seeming stability, Belarus is facing a potentially existential crisis as Russia’s growing influence threatens its existence as a sovereign state. This is partly a consequence of escalating tensions between Russia and NATO over the war in Ukraine. However, it is also to a significant extent the result of Western sanctions and diplomatic isolation imposed on the Lukashenka regime in response to its brutal political repression and facilitation of Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine. These measures have effectively stripped Belarus of its ability to balance its reliance on Russia with engagement with the West – and Europe in particular.
The normative or principled policy strategy of aiming to democratise Belarus and to incentivise Minsk to distance itself from Moscow through isolation and sanctions does not seem to foster political liberalisation, while enhancing – rather than diminishing – the Kremlin’s influence.
In an attempt to prevent Belarus from turning into a full-blown vassal and forward military base of Russia, as well as to lower the risks of military escalation in the region, Lukashenka has in recent months been seeking rapprochement with the West by reaching out to Western capitals (most notably Washington), releasing some political prisoners, and moving and down-scaling the Zapad-2025 exercises.
European policymakers should look for opportunities to push back Russia’s growing influence in Belarus by strengthening Belarusian sovereignty and strategic autonomy through pragmatic engagement, focusing on normalising diplomatic relations and targeted sanctions relief. Such an approach can also enable the EU to convert its considerable leverage over Belarus into transactional deals on, for instance, ending Minsk’s instrumentalised migration to EU member states, releasing political prisoners in Belarus, and limiting Russia’s military presence in the country. Given that pragmatic engagement does not exclude a humanitarian dimension, it does not necessarily equate pure Realpolitik.
However, pragmatic engagement also entails costs, as it can weaken the position of the Belarusian democratic opposition in exile, cause reputational damage to the EU, and create loopholes in the sanctions regime against Russia. Balancing these costs against the benefits of engagement entails complicated trade-offs. Moreover, while the costs of engagement remain particularly significant as long as the war in Ukraine continues and Lukashenka stays in power, the longer Europe delays efforts to seek rapprochement with Minsk, the harder it will become to counter Russia’s deepening influence in Belarus.
The EU and its member states urgently need to foster a policy debate on when the benefits of pragmatic engagement with Belarus would outweigh the costs. Such a debate needs to be grounded in an understanding of the opportunities, limitations, and trade-offs of rivalling strategies that are on offer.
About the author:
Kaspar Pucek is a Research Fellow within the Security Unit and the Russia & Eastern Europe Centre (CREEC) at the Clingendael Institute.