Opinion & Analysis

The EU needs its trusted industrial partners to share the cost of derisking

Trusted partnerships with the world’s middle powers are the EU’s best tool for sharing the cost of derisking, but only if the various partnerships are predictable and cooperation reaches the firms, regions and Member States that will ultimately need to pay the bill. The European Commission’s Industrial Accelerator Act (IAA) will determine who those partners are.

The IAA covers energy-intensive industries such as steel, aluminium and cement, the automotive sector and net-zero technologies such as batteries, solar panels and wind turbines. It ties public procurement and subsidies to ‘Made in Europe’ content, determined by where a product and its components are made. Subsidies for electric cars, for example, would require vehicles to be assembled in the EU and at least 70 % of the value of non-battery components to be sourced from within the EU or a trusted partner country.

In the Commission proposal, products and components from free trade and procurement partners such as Canada and South Korea will count as European. Now that the final decision lies with the European Parliament (EP) and Council, attempts are being made to narrow this definition.

The Irish Presidency’s flexible definition would create a ‘partner origin’ list that the Commission could revise to add and remove countries that create high-risk dependencies. Meanwhile, the recent would limit ‘Made in Europe’ to the UK and the European Economic Area, subject to full reciprocity, leaving out partners such as the Asian tech middle powers. France-Germany deal would limit ‘Made in Europe’ to the UK and the European Economic Area, subject to full reciprocity, leaving out partners such as the Asian tech middle powers.

Thus, a free trade agreement alone doesn’t guarantee that partners will make the cut. With the Council yet to agree its position and the EP’s committees voting on 1 December, the Act won’t apply for at least another 18 months, yet firms are already having to make investment decisions under this uncertainty today.

Derisking comes with a price tag

Dependence on China is costly, as the weaponisation of rare earths has shown. But reducing it is also costly. The International Energy Agency (IEA) estimates that producing solar modules, wind turbines and batteries costs up to 45 % more in the EU than in China, and for battery cells the gap reaches around 90 %, mostly because European producers lack scale.

The IAA would finance the scale-up through public procurement and state aid, which Pierre Jouvet, the EP’s IMCO co-rapporteur, puts at more than EUR 2 500 billion a year.

But the bill won’t fall evenly. Member States differ in fiscal space and industrial starting points. Several central and south-eastern governments have warned that low-carbon criteria could distort competition within the single market, and 15 Member States have since called for ‘proportionate’ European-origin requirements in the Warsaw Declaration.

The EU’s international partnerships could help lower the bill. The IEA estimates that EU solar modules made with wafers from North Africa would cost almost 20 % less than fully EU-made ones, and partners with advanced manufacturing capacity could carry part of the scale-up burden in the same way.

Narrow eligibility works in the opposite direction as well. If partners’ products and components aren’t counted, then non-EU firms have less reason to invest in the EU or to team up with European companies. South Korean exporters already argue that local production conditions for subsidies aren’t being reciprocated.

South Korea as a test case

South Korean-owned battery and automotive plants in the EU already count as European production but they often rely on components made in Korea, so whether Korean-made components and products qualify as ‘partner origin’ will shape the cost of the EU’s clean-tech supply chains. Korean industry hopes the IAA will let it compete with China on equal terms, which would depend on eligibility rules that are still being negotiated.

The EU and South Korea definitely don’t lack frameworks, ranging from their free trade agreement to the Digital and Green Partnerships, Korea’s association to Horizon Europe in 2025 and the Strategic Dialogue on Economic Security. The June 2026 EU-Korea summit added a Competitiveness Partnership and a High-Level Economic Dialogue to coordinate trade, economic security and industrial policy across sectors.

These frameworks haven’t yet reached those who’ll carry the costs. The Member States and regions that host Korean investment and would pay the procurement premium aren’t sufficiently represented in key discussions. Meanwhile, relevant information on EU rules reaches Korean companies slowly through sectoral and trade associations.

From partnership commitments to action

The EU-Korea High-Level Economic Dialogue has yet to hold its first meeting, leaving room to help shape its direction. It should become the channel that informs and consults South Korea on partner treatment under the IAA, including the conditions that could restrict or withdraw that treatment.

Member States and regions should have a standing role in preparing it, so that those financing diversification have a say in how partner eligibility works in practice. A stakeholder track should inform, train and mobilise companies. This would include national and regional business associations, through joint trainings on the IAA and the EU’s product and due diligence rules, and through matchmaking between Korean investors and European firms and regions, starting with the Member States that have the least fiscal space.

The debate over ‘Made in Europe’ will decide who counts as a trusted partner. Whether trust lowers the cost of derisking depends on whether these partnerships work for the firms, regions and Member States that carry the bill.

About the autor:

Dr. Ceren Ergenc is a Research Fellow at the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) and an affiliated researcher at the East Asian Studies and Research Centre, Autonomous University of Barcelona.

Fanny Sauvignon is a Researcher in the Foreign Policy Unit at CEPS and the current Chair of CEPS’ Diversity, Equity and Inclusion Committee (DEIC).

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