Opinion & Analysis

The European defence industrial base: overcoming critical materials’ supply chain obstacles and vulnerabilities

In February 2025, British Prime Minister Keir Starmer promised to increase defence spending to 2.5% of GDP from April 2027, the “biggest sustained increase in defence spending since the Cold War” (UK Prime Minister’s Office, 2026). This commitment fits into the wider trend of extraordinary defence investments by European and NATO states in response to the changing geopolitical and security environment in Europe (European Commission, 2025c). For instance, European defence investments reached “EUR 102bn in 2024, almost doubling the amount spent in 2021”, justified by the need to develop European defence capabilities and readiness (European Commission, 2025c, p. 16). Yet Europe faces significant structural vulnerabilities in the supply of essential critical raw materials needed for defence capacity, innovation, and reindustrialisation (European Commission, 2024c, pp. 159, 165). Consequently, the assumption that increased defence spending will automatically translate into enhanced defence industrial capability is tenuous.

Against this backdrop, this paper examines the structural obstacles surrounding the security of defenceessential critical raw materials, focusing specifically on the EU’s diversification strategy through partnerships with resource-rich African states. Two main challenges are identified: international competition for access to African critical raw materials, particularly from China and Russia, and policy constraints that highlight the gap between Europe’s strategic objectives and the reality of strategic partnerships. Ultimately, overcoming these interrelated challenges of dependency, access, and policy requires the EU to mobilise a comprehensive toolbox of diplomatic, economic, and development statecraft instruments. Thus, a Europe-first approach to security and defence, through supply chain diversification, is not fundamentally incompatible with international engagement. Rather, it depends on the EU adopting a long-term, proactive foreign economic policy regarding critical raw materials.

 

About the author

Elea Huguet is a Junior Research Manager in Defence and Security at Finabel.

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