To date, the Arctic has played only a minor role in European efforts to achieve digital sovereignty. Yet digital infrastructure in the High North is a key component of this endeavour. The European Union’s (EU) Arctic Strategy, which is due to be updated this year, should therefore not be limited to traditional security issues. This is particularly true in light of hybrid threats in the Baltic Sea region. Of particular importance are European projects to expand Arctic submarine cable infrastructure, which constitute critical infrastructure. However, these initiatives require an ambitious EU that recognises its capacity to deliver innovation and sustainability in the development of green technologies.
In January 2026, the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Kaja Kallas, attended the Arctic Frontiers conference, held annually in Tromsø, Norway. There, she stated that a new EU Arctic policy was needed, “one that reflects the times we live in and the world we want to see, including a secure Arctic”.
To date, the (European) Arctic has played only a minor role in discussions on how to safeguard Europe’s security and defence. Yet the expansion of Arctic submarine cable infrastructure is a key means of securing the continent’s digital sovereignty. However, this aspect has been neglected in discussions on the EU’s Arctic Strategy to date. One reason is the wide range of security threat scenarios in the region. Three groups of actors merit particular attention in this context:
- the five Arctic coastal states, namely the United States (including Alaska), the Kingdom of Denmark (Greenland), Russia, Norway (Svalbard) and Canada, often referred to as the A5
- the three “small Arctic states” of Finland, Sweden and Iceland
- the Arctic Council, the central intergovernmental forum for cooperation among Arctic states, including representatives of Indigenous peoples as Permanent Participants
All eight Arctic states are members of the Arctic Council. Six EU member states (Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland and Spain) hold observer status. Each of the three groups of stakeholders deals with different challenges in terms of geopolitical interests, the state of infrastructure and Europe’s efforts to have a say in the High North.
Following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the EU suspended its cooperation with Moscow in the Arctic. For the EU, this means exploring new forms of cooperation as well. Whereas Denmark is an EU member state, Greenland and the Faroe Islands are not part of the EU. Nevertheless, in 2024 the European Commission opened an office in the Greenlandic capital, Nuuk. The EU took a clear and united stance against US President Donald Trump’s territorial claims to the island. Norway and Iceland are not members of the EU but are part of the European Economic Area.
Diverging priorities
Norway takes a somewhat ambivalent approach to Arctic policy: While pursuing its own interests in the region, it also supports EU engagement there. Sweden is interested in a strong EU role in the Arctic, although so far this has mainly focused on establishing an environmental policy frame-work. Finland, like Norway, supports the EU’s efforts to obtain observer status in the Arctic Council. Since submitting an application to this effect in 2013, the EU has been permitted to participate in the Council’s deliberations as a de facto observer, although no formal decision has yet been taken on the matter. In view of Russian, US and Chinese interests in the Arctic, a strategic partnership between the EU and Canada is under discussion, for example.
The EU’s current Arctic Strategy, which was presented in 2021 under the title “A stronger EU engagement for a peaceful, sustainable and prosperous Arctic”, is set to be replaced by an updated version later this year. The public consultation phase for this ended on 16 March 2026. Back in November 2025, the European Parliament had already voted by a large majority in favour of strengthening the EU’s role in Europe’s High North. It regards the Arctic as a region integral to Europe’s security.
The new Arctic Strategy is expected to address cross-cutting issues such as science and research, technology, connectivity and innovation, as well as the rights of Indigenous peoples. During the consultation process, European research institutes called for international (terrestrial) climate research to remain a strategic priority. However, this will need to be aligned with the Commission’s priorities, including sustainable prosperity, competitiveness, security and defence. Above all, the digital sovereignty sought by the EU could serve as a cross-cutting theme, linking existing priorities such as climate and environmental protection, sustainable and inclusive development, and enhanced international cooperation.
About the authors
Dr. habil. Annegret Bendiek is a Senior Fellow in the EU / Europe Research Division at SWP.
Svenja Holste is a Research Fellow at the Institute for World Society Studies at Bielefeld University.