A series of scandals in Ukraine has shown that Russia’s war of aggression has not put an end to corruption in the country. Although Ukraine’s specialised institutions play an important role in combating corruption, the country’s governance model does not yet meet the requirements of the rule of law, allowing corruption to remain entrenched. The difficulties involved in fundamentally overhauling this model are often underestimated. However, such a transformation will be necessary for Ukraine’s accession to the EU. Both Kyiv and Brussels will need to work on several tracks simultaneously to consolidate the rule of law in Ukraine.
In July 2025, the Ukrainian parliament passed a law that stripped two of the most important anti-corruption institutions of many of their key powers. Nine days later, following public protests and demands from external actors, most of the provisions of that law were revoked by another piece of legislation; however, the fact that the original version was passed shows that the country’s political leadership has not yet committed itself to the rule of law. Rather, ways are being sought to circumvent or eliminate necessary procedures or at least render them harmless for certain categories of the elite.
Despite having been triggered by a series of corruption scandals, the reshuffles in the government and parts of the security apparatus in early 2026 further demonstrated that the fight against corruption is not a priority. The biggest stir was caused by the so-called “Operation Midas”, in which the investigative authorities uncovered a system of kickbacks centred around the state-owned energy company Energoatom. In the fallout, the minister of energy and the minister of justice, who had formerly served as minister of energy, had to step down from their posts, while Andriy Yermak, the powerful head of the Presidential Office and Volodymyr Zelenskyi’s right-hand man, was forced to tender his resignation after the National Anti-Corruption Bureau had searched his home.
Nevertheless, it was not primarily the desire to combat corruption that informed the personnel decisions necessitated by these and other dismissals. Rather, factors such as the popularity of the new appointees, their loyalty to the president, their expertise and their networks played the main role. This applies not least to the appointment of Kyrylo Budanov as the new head of the Presidential Office. Budanov has both profound military knowledge and good contacts with parts of Donald Trump’s team. Previously, he served as head of military intelligence, in which capacity he was responsible for a number of successful high-profile operations that made him extremely popular in Ukraine.
It is understandable that various criteria – and not just the fight against corruption – have been important in the selection of new politicians and civil servants, especially as the country’s overriding concern is to survive the war. However, the phenomenon of corruption is currently being addressed only at the margins. Even if the anti-corruption institutions do not come under further pressure (which is far from certain), they have to operate alongside a judiciary that has been only partly reformed and still offers numerous opportunities for corruption. Furthermore, corruption has become an integral part of Ukraine’s governance system and cannot be brought under control without a transformation of that system. The fight against corruption therefore requires a broader approach aimed at ensuring a balanced separation of powers and an elite of a higher calibre. In this context, the war represents both an obstacle and an opportunity.
About the Author:
Susan Stewart is a Senior Fellow at SWP. She focuses on Ukrainian domestic and foreign policy, and EU-Russian relations.