Opinion & Analysis

Tough love: How the EU should tackle corruption and the rule of law in Ukraine

War has not made Ukraine’s problems with corruption and the rule of law vanish. The EU should put more pressure on reform-resistant Ukrainian elites through robust financial conditionality and clear public messaging.

The EU accession process gives Ukrainians a glimmer of hope in the midst of a mounting military pressure on its cities and frontlines. On the domestic front, however, Ukraine’s prospects of accession are being hampered by foot-dragging and backlashes against the adoption and implementation of key EU reform requirements. War can explain why Ukraine has had to postpone elections and cannot conduct all-inclusive public consultations, but it does not excuse deliberate attempts to undermine efforts to strengthen the rule of law and economic governance. Ukraine needs stronger external incentives if it is to make the fundamental transformation required for EU membership. The EU must use the tools of financial and public diplomacy to undermine the systemic power of those in the Ukrainian elite who want to block reform.

Foot-dragging and backlash

The specialised anti-corruption agencies, which Ukraine established after the Euromaidan revolution in 2014, are struggling to maintain their independence. The culmination of their difficulties came with the adoption of legislation in July 2025 to subordinate the National Anti-corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU) and the Specialised Anti-corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO) to the notorious Prosecutor General’s Office, which is widely believed to obey the presidential administration rather than acting impartially. Observers suspect that the legislation was an attempt to stall NABU/SAPO investigations of the entourages of President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and Ukrainian parliamentarians. Public protests and a firm EU reaction forced a U-turn on this occasion. But vested interests have consistently sought to gain control over the specialised anti-corruption agencies.

About the Author

Henrik Larsen is a non-resident fellow with the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA) and the International Center for Defence and Security (ICDS), and an associate expert with the Geopolitics and Security Studies Center (GSSC).

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