Europe could become one of the defining issues in France’s 2027 presidential election. This has already happened in the recent past. In 2017, Emmanuel Macron campaigned on a strongly pro-European ticket. He won against Marine Le Pen, who pledged to radically renegotiate France’s relationship with the EU, leave the eurozone and put the resulting settlement to a referendum.
In the vote next year, France’s fiscal crisis could reinforce this dynamic. Questions about debt, spending and taxation are increasingly becoming questions about the EU’s fiscal constraints, the European Central Bank and France’s credibility within the eurozone. In recent weeks, Le Pen and her campaign partner, Jordan Bardella, have mentioned their plans to halve France’s net contributions to the EU as part of an effort to bring national finances under control.
ECFR’s recent qualitative research, based on almost 6,000 AI-moderated interviews about Europe conducted in May 2026 in six countries (including France), may offer presidential hopefuls three worthy lessons. Pro-European candidates may find it useful to make “Europe” one of the campaign’s main battlegrounds. But, if any of them is to beat Marine Le Pen, they will need to speak to the broader French pessimism, which extends to perceptions of Europe. They will also need to escape the temptation to treat the two political extremes as equivalent. And they will need to find a way to drive wedges within the National Rally (RN) electorate.
1. Account for euro-declinism
To start with, the French—when compared with the British, Dutch, Germans, Italians and Poles—are the most negative about Europe. When we code the interviews based on how people talk about Europe’s future, France ends up having the fewest “positives” (just 12%) and, alongside Italy, the most “negatives” (45%).
Those voters who chose Le Pen in the second round of the 2022 presidential election are predominantly negative (76%); but the other side of the political spectrum is mostly “uncertain” rather than positive about Europe.
It is typical for the current electorate of RN to criticise the EU, and say things like “Europe is doing badly, it’s mired in economic crisis, soon to be at war, frankly it’s rubbish”, to quote just one of the respondents from our research. But voters of the other parties, while less critical, are rarely talking about Europe with optimism. Europe “has changed a lot, there’s no longer the same sense of security. (…) We can no longer rely on the United States”, observes a 34-year-old sympathiser of the Socialist Party (PS). Meanwhile, what worries a 43-year-old voter of the far-left France Unbowed (LFI) is “the rise of racist and populist ideology, plus significant debt and declining industry”.
Across the political spectrum, the French tend to talk about Europe in declinist terms—pointing to a general deterioration or a loss of normality. A “Europe can-do” spirit, which Macron embodied at the beginning of his first presidency, is now marginal (though for different reasons depending on the electorate). Supporters of the PS usually point to war and security as the biggest challenge facing Europe; those of LFI tend to mention economic pressures; meanwhile, many RN voters emphasise problems with immigration and integration.
It does not mean that, unlike in 2017, a candidate campaigning in favour of Europe today is destined to fail. But they would need to convince many of those centrist voters who are currently negative or uncertain about Europe. And they would need to make a strong case about Europe’s indispensability for France to deal with its key challenges, as well as about Europe’s capacity for renovation.
2. Escape the “neither-nor”
The mainstream in France struggles to deal with the “radical left”. Macron and parts of the French centre have repeatedly framed the RN and LFI as “two extremes”, even though Macron himself has at other moments rejected a strict equivalence between them.
There are good reasons why LFI is not part of the French mainstream. Its leader, Jean-Luc Mélenchon, has a long record of positions on Russia and Ukraine that critics—including much of the French left—regard as excessively accommodating towards Moscow. He has taken positions on Taiwan closely aligned with Beijing’s and has opposed key elements of Europe’s rearmament agenda. His emphasis on rapid de-escalation and negotiations has repeatedly put him at odds with those who argue that Ukraine needs stronger military support before meaningful talks with Moscow are possible. Mélenchon and other LFI figures have also repeatedly faced accusations of antisemitism; not simply for their criticism of Israel, but over statements that critics argue invoke antisemitic tropes or minimise antisemitism in France (Mélenchon and LFI strongly reject those accusations).
There are therefore substantial political and foreign-policy reasons for mainstream candidates to distance themselves from LFI. But that does not mean the mainstream should treat LFI voters as politically equivalent to RN voters—especially on Europe. The former are far more strongly European in their self-identification than the latter.
Asked about the extent to which they think of themselves as European, 53% of them say “a lot” compared to just 13% among RN supporters. They do often worry about European values too, whether it concerns the continent’s dealings with the US and Israel or its approach to migration and climate change. “If the different countries do not succumb to racism, nationalism and insularity, Europe can only flourish”, says a 51-year-old voter of the party.
Those candidates (especially on the centre-left, like Raphaël Glucksmann but also centrists like Gabriel Attal and Édouard Philippe) hoping to enter the second round alongside Le Pen and defeat her afterwards would have strong reasons to speak to parts of the radical-left electorate.
3. Drive a wedge within the far-right
When asked about the extent to which they feel European, supporters of the RN are divided almost equally between those who respond “a lot” or “a little”, and those who say “not really” or “not at all”. In most cases, they end up being negative about Europe, but this does not necessarily make them anti-European.
For example, those RN voters who consider themselves at least “a little” European are more likely to present war and security (rather than cost-of-living or migration) as Europe’s greater challenge today. As a group, they are more supportive of Ukraine and more confident of European solidarity should France be attacked. Unlike their fellow RN voters, they are mostly supportive of the idea of taking on common European debt to fund defence spending. They also show a greater understanding for the continent’s current difficulties, often describing Europe as dealing “not very well” rather than “not at all well” with these.
Taken together, around one-eighth of RN’s electorate is “uncertain” about Europe. These voters can say things like “Europe must remain united, stand together in the face of threats”; or “I’ve never felt disappointed or ashamed of being European”, or “I’m proud to be part of Europe”, to quote just some respondents from our research. When asked to describe today’s Europe, another RN supporter says “It’s not as powerful as it was before but its situation is beginning to improve. [Because] people are becoming aware of it.” These are not opinions one would typically expect from voters of the far right.
There are many other reasons unrelated to Europe why people choose to support Le Pen and her party. But there is still a potential European-security wedge within the RN electorate that other candidates could benefit from. For the moment, Le Pen is trying to reconcile the RN’s sovereignty agenda with a segment of her electorate that sees European solidarity and collective defence as necessary. Her plans to slash France’s net EU contributions are largely addressed at the sovereigntist part of her electorate. Meanwhile, her recent criticism of Russia looked like a message to the more Europe- and security-minded voters. But this grand écart could prove hard to sustain over the long campaign.
The scramble for Europe
Europe may therefore matter in the presidential vote not because it neatly divides France into pro- and anti-European camps, as it appeared to do in 2017, but for precisely the opposite reason: because it cuts across the country’s increasingly entrenched political blocs. The battle in 2027 may be decided by voters hiding in unexpected places: the European-minded voter of LFI, the Europe-doubting voter of the centre, or the RN voter who has concluded that France cannot be secure without Europe.
About the author
Paweł Zerka is a senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations.