Sanctions are a key instrument in the European Union’s foreign and security policy. Although their enforcement depends on the Union’s ability to act legally as well as politically, prosecutions remain constrained by national borders. For this reason, France and Germany proposed in 2022 that the mandate of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) be expanded to cover violations of EU sanctions. That initiative failed to gain sufficient support in the Council, nor was the problem solved by the 2024 directive defining offences and penalties. The change of government in Hungary and the review of EPPO’s mandate scheduled for 2026 offer an opportunity to revisit the issue.
In 2024, the EU adopted Directive 2024/1226, which established criminal offences and minimum penalties for violations of its sanctions. This was a significant step towards harmonising the approaches of the respective member states. The EU had already made a start in 2022, classifying the circumvention and violation of EU sanctions as criminal offences to be harmonised across the Union.
Until 2024, the inconsistent handling of sanctions violations was largely attributable to the different legal frameworks of the EU member states. A 2021 study by the Eurojust-supported Genocide Network highlighted significant differences in legal classification, jurisdiction and penalties between the member states. In November 2022 the member states reached political agreement on a proposal from the European Commission, to include sanctions violations in the list of “EU crimes” under Article 83(1) TFEU (which includes terrorism, money laundering, corruption and currency counterfeiting). That created a legal basis for harmonising this aspect of criminal law, and in particular for setting minimum standards.
The directive was adopted in April 2024. It lays out harmonised rules to be applied by the competent authorities of each EU member state. Importantly, it defines what constitutes a sanctions violation, including the shipment or re-export of prohibited goods, as well as the use of financial arrangements to conceal the origin or destination of financial transactions. Actions intended to circumvent sanctions also constitute criminal offences. The directive specifies minimum prison sentences for serious infringements, as well as administrative and financial penalties for businesses. It stipulates that legal entities – as well as individuals – may be prosecuted (in Germany still only as an administrative offence).
Despite these developments, effective enforcement remains a significant challenge, in terms of numbers of investigations, prosecutions and convictions. Although legal harmonisation is progressing, thanks to the directive, prosecutions are likely to remain fragmented and national (in particular with regard to resources, prioritisation, cooperation and intensity of investigations). The European Union Agency for Criminal Justice Cooperation (Eurojust) notes in its 2025 Annual Report that cross-border judicial cooperation is frequently hampered by differences in procedures and prosecutorial engagement. With regard to the prosecution of sanctions violations, the practical effectiveness of harmonised EU criminal law instruments remains very limited.
As the few known investigations into illegal exports to Russia demonstrate, sanctions violations tend to entail transnational financial, supply and concealment structures that necessitate coordinated prosecutions across multiple jurisdictions. The relevant cases, including those in Germany, involve multi-stage, cross-border export and concealment networks involving shipments across multiple states (including third countries) and the use of intermediaries.
The complexity of breaches of EU sanctions is exemplified by the handling of the luxury yacht “Dilbar” owned by the Russian oligarch Alisher Usmanov. Investigations in multiple EU member states and third countries were required to trace ownership and confiscate assets. The countries involved included Germany (ownership investigations and asset seizure), France (enforcement measures to freeze assets), Italy (measures to verify or secure assets) and Spain (investigations relating to ownership and usage).
The intricate nature of the investigation illustrates the need for complementary institutional arrangements and raises the question of expanding the jurisdiction of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office.
About the author:
Elie Cavigneaux is a Visiting Fellow in the EU / Europe Research Division at SWP.