The attack on Iran by the US and Israel is good news for Russia but bad news for Europe, including Ukraine, and ultimately for the US itself. China could emerge as a long-term winner. Europeans must look after their own interests, regardless of Trump’s wrath. In launching a war of aggression against Iran on February 28th 2026, the US and Israel have caused renewed chaos in the Middle East, after a few months of relative stability following the US-brokered ceasefire agreement in Gaza. US president Donald Trump seems not to have considered what the war’s wider effects might be, or its winners and losers; Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu may not care.
The winners
Russia seems likely to be the biggest winner, in several ways. First, higher oil and gas prices will boost Russian export revenues, enabling the regime to ease pressure on the civilian economy, and to keep ploughing money into the war against Ukraine. Global oil prices rose from under $60 a barrel in the first week of January to more than $100 on March 13th, while natural gas prices in the EU more than doubled between mid-December 2025 and early March. Both prices could go much higher if the Strait of Hormuz remains closed for a significant period. In an effort to increase the amount of oil in the global market, the US has suspended sanctions on the purchase of Russian oil, initially for a 30-day period. Second, as one of the world’s major fertiliser producers, Russia will also be well-placed to replace Saudi Arabia as a supplier if the Saudis are unable to export their products. That would give Moscow another source of revenue, and scope to withhold fertiliser supplies from Europe unless sanctions are suspended or lifted. Third, the war has handed Russia a valuable propaganda tool to deflect criticism of its war against Ukraine. Putin’s spokesperson, Dmitry Peskov, was clearly relishing the moment when he told a Russian television commentator: “I don’t even know how to call on anyone to adhere to the norms and principles
Israel is also likely to be among the winners. By vastly reducing the power of Hamas in Gaza and of Hezbollah in Lebanon, it had already reduced the threat from Iran’s proxies. The joint US and Israeli attacks on Iran’s nuclear facilities in 2025, together with the targeted assassinations of Iranian nuclear scientists, had already set back Iran’s nuclear weapons programme considerably. The recent attacks have killed many of Iran’s top military, political and spiritual leaders and destroyed much of Iran’s military infrastructure. Over time, that should make it harder for Iran to keep attacking Israel – especially if the war causes internal conflict in Iran (even if there is so far no sign of the regime losing its grip on power). For Netanyahu personally, the war might help his political fortunes as Israel heads into October elections, though polls show only a slight increase in support for his Likud party so far.
China may suffer limited short-term economic damage, but it could turn out to be a winner in the long term. Around half of its oil imports and one-third of its gas imports come from the Gulf. Rising global oil and gas prices and disruptions of flows from the Gulf will therefore have a negative impact on the Chinese economy, but unless the closure of the Strait of Hormuz persists, the effects will be cushioned by China’s large production surpluses and inventories. A broader downturn in the global economy and shrinking global demand for Chinese exports would hit China’s export-oriented economy, forcing it either to cut production capacity or shift to greater domestic consumption.
China’s advantage, however, is that oil and gas make up a relatively small share of its total energy mix – 26.2 per cent, compared with 57.0 per cent for Europe, according to the International Energy Agency. The role of renewables in China’s energy mix is increasing rapidly, and China leads the world in the transition to electric vehicles, which will mitigate the effect of a prolonged reduction in oil supplies. In the shorter term, coal still accounts for about 60 per cent of China’s energy mix, giving Beijing scope to shift more power generation to coal if necessary. In addition, though China has in the past tried to avoid excessive dependency on any one supplier of oil or gas, it could increase imports from Russia if the Gulf remains out of bounds for some time.
The long-term wins for China would come in three forms. First, Beijing will be able to take advantage of the damage that the war is doing to US relations with countries in the Middle East. The US administration seems not to have foreseen that Iran would attack facilities in the Gulf states with drones, and reportedly turned down a 2025 Ukrainian offer of counter-drone technology. As a result, US partners in the region have suffered attacks on oil refineries, desalination plants, airports and other targets. Nor was Washington prepared for the Iranians to disrupt shipping transiting the Strait of Hormuz: in 2025 it removed its dedicated mine-clearance ships from the Gulf. Trump suggested that other countries, including China, should send forces to escort ships through the strait – though he got a universally negative response, even from NATO allies. China, by comparison, can portray itself as the stable, predictable ‘adult in the room’ – a country less likely to drag its partners into unnecessary wars.
About the Authors:
Thomas Maddock is the Clara Marina O’Donnell fellow (2025-2026). While at the CER, his work will centre on the EU’s foreign policy, particularly in the Middle East.
Ian Bond has been the deputy director of the Centre for European Reform since November 2023. He joined the CER as foreign policy director in April 2013. Prior to that, he was a member of the British diplomatic service for 28 years.