The EU may need to deploy a peacekeeping force to Ukraine. However, without urgent regulatory changes, its member states are unprepared for the risks of direct confrontation with Russia.
The last four months in West–Russia relations have felt like years. As Russia continues its offensive in Ukraine and claims to have reclaimed most of the Kursk region, President Donald Trump is pushing both Vladimir Putin and Volodymyr Zelensky for a negotiated end to the war—leaving Europeans sidelined in the process.
In response to isolation from these talks, European leaders have reinvigorated their planning for a potential deployment of European forces in Ukraine, with the aim to deter Russia from violating a future ceasefire while allowing Ukraine to restore its military and stabilise its domestic politics. However, the deployment of European peacekeepers—or a “European reassurance force”—is, as it stands, unrealistic. The idea goes against Russia’s key wartime demands; such a force has only a small deterrence value and any deployment has the potential to lead to Russian attacks against European troops. It might even cause Russia to attack other targets outside Ukraine.
Europe therefore needs to prepare for a scenario where deployment of its peacekeeping force means it has to wage war against Russia. Direct defence investments in Europe are costly and take time, but EU member states can improve the regulatory and legal grounds for wartime personnel needs while expanding diplomatic efforts to avoid a larger confrontation.
Rationale for deployment
The question of European peacekeepers reflects a broader contest between European and Russian commitment to their respective foreign policy goals. To date, Europe has shown questionable unity in its support for Ukraine, while Russia remains laser-focused on dismantling Ukrainian statehood. Now strategic reality dictates that, if European support for Ukraine is genuine, Europe must deploy a force before or during a potential ceasefire to help stabilise Ukrainian politics and the country’s civil-military relations. It will also cement the European commitment to support for Ukraine by putting its money where its mouth is. But this is where it gets tricky: should Europe commit to deploying a peacekeeping force, Russia could take the opportunity to transform this manoeuvre into a strategic trap.
Opponents of a European peacekeeping force claim that Russia, having suffered heavy losses in troops and equipment, no longer poses a serious threat to Europe. But they should understand that Moscow would perceive any removal of European support from Ukraine—ie, not deploying a peacekeeping force—as a sign of Western weakness. Just as America’s withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021 shaped Russian perceptions of Western strategic decay, Putin would see a European abandonment of Ukraine as an invitation to retaliate across the entire EU for its anti-Russian policies, spurred on by its moment of geopolitical weakness.
But, conversely, Moscow views any such deployment as critical escalation. Russia is prepared to respond in Ukraine and beyond if all parties do not agree on the permanent conflict settlement arrangements (provisions of the peace agreement) before any ceasefire.
It would view any European deployment in Ukraine as a direct affront to its long-standing objections regarding NATO enlargement and the positioning of Western military infrastructure near its borders—overall, a Western anti-Russian effort to integrate Ukraine into NATO while preserving the prevailing Russian view that Ukraine is as a hostile, nationalist regime that suppresses the Russian language and glorifies Nazi collaborators.
Avoiding a strategic blindspot
Aside from geopolitical considerations, Europeans face critical military dilemmas regarding troop deployment. The EU cannot realistically provide a force large enough to deter Russia from attacking Europe (from 150,000 troops plus reserves). However, while a smaller force is more feasible (from around 10,000 to around 40,000 troops), it may be insufficient and risk being a sitting duck for Russian attacks. Although military analysts claim that effective dispersal, entrenchment and robust air defences mitigate the risk of a high-casualty scenario, even minimal European casualties in Ukraine will start a new page in the book of European political history.
It is also unclear how resilient European public opinion will be once the first batch of bodies from a major war with Russia are repatriated to their home countries. For example, the majority of France’s population strongly oppose sending troops to Ukraine during the war, but support the deployment of peacekeepers. Similarly, the majority of Britons support sending British soldiers as part of the broader European peacekeeping force after a peace deal in Ukraine. However, only 9% of Britons are willing to see their children fighting. Russian information operations, sabotage groups and Europe’s pro-Russia political parties will be on standby to help destabilise member state political systems once the dead and injured start to flow.
At the same time, Russian attacks against European soldiers on the battlefield may provide Russia with a powerful boost in legitimising the war. The pro-war parts of Russian society will take imperial pride in fighting Europeans, who they perceive as envying Russia for its possession of vast natural resources. It would likely boost Russia’s great power feeling, in turn increasing national recruitment and public support for its military—much like the Ukrainian incursion into the Kursk region.
Moscow will try hard to use any such escalation to undermine European support for such the peacekeeping deployment operation and for Ukraine in general. As well as Russia’s potential efforts to weaponise information flows, for example pertaining to injured personnel, it is likely to portray the deployment as part of Zelensky’s “destructive efforts” to trap Europeans and Russians in a military confrontation. Russia views any deployment as a multilateral arrangement to shift the financial and political burden of the conflict from America to Europe, legitimising Zelensky’s attempt to create a wider confrontation between Russia and the Europeans.
For their part, European governments should know how to mitigate the destabilising effects of this potential Russian influence on domestic public opinion if their forces end up confronting Russia in Ukraine.
Readying for conflict
However, Europeans should not abandon the idea of a peacekeeping force deployment. If they aim to prevent a Ukrainian defeat, there may be no alternative. But they need to embed such discussions within a broader set of measures aimed at deterring military confrontation with Russia. European governments should—beyond advancing the defence union in the long term—signal that they are preparing for the demands of potential attritional warfare in the short term.
Europe could quickly adopt a more robust wartime posture by increasing salaries, welfare benefits, and legal protections for soldiers and their families, while easing regulations and offering targeted incentives to civilian industries involved in defence supply chains. In parallel, EU member states should prepare regulatory measures to temporary limit defeatist narratives in the media and similar civic movements for the duration of the large-scale conflict, expand reservist training and introduce wartime bans on contract termination for active-duty personnel.
Additionally, governments could consider legally regulated recruitment of inmates and migrants for frontline roles, offering postwar residency or citizenship incentives. Though politically controversial, such measures mirror past EU crisis policies—such as deals with Libyan militias to stop migrant flows—and would serve as a strong deterrent signal to hostile actors.
At the same time, Europe should use any diplomatic means at their disposal to influence Russia and secure peace in Ukraine without direct military confrontation and under diminishing US support. By making immediate preparations for the worst case scenario, members of a European “coalition of the willing” will elevate the perceived seriousness of their commitment to Ukraine—thereby making their diplomatic initiatives more credible and deserving of Russian attention.
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Even if carried out with the best intentions, a European peacekeeping deployment could effectively reinforce and escalate the official Russian justification for its invasion of Ukraine. European governments should therefore be preparing for the worst-case scenario—a large-scale war—if they really want to put boots on the ground in Ukraine.
This is especially crucial since Russia holds the military initiative. A ceasefire is a conditional political decision and Moscow will inevitably seek concessions, such as the lifting of some sanctions. As such, any incentives from Europe will appear far more compelling when backed by a credible display of strength.
About the author:
Kirill Shamiev is a policy fellow with the Wider Europe programme at the European Council on Foreign Relations. He focuses on Russia’s civil-military relations and domestic politics and policymaking.