Opinion & Analysis

Why this energy shock is different

Unlike recent energy crises, today’s geopolitical shock is destroying supply rather than rerouting it, exposing the limits of the standard policy toolkit. Governments can mitigate its impact on those most exposed, but only if fiscal and monetary policy work in concert.

CANNES—The Gulf ceasefire lasted barely three weeks. After Iranian attacks on three commercial ships in the Strait of Hormuz, the United States struck more than 80 targets, revoked Iran’s oil-sanctions waiver, and declared the memorandum of understanding “over.” Yet the market response was telling: Brent crude rose to around $79 per barrel—a meaningful jump, but far below April’s $120 peak, when the strait was closed outright. That gap between renewed war and restrained prices confronts policymakers with a key question: Is this the road back to blockade, or a violent renegotiation of the terms of passage?

Five months into the war, the severity of the underlying shock is not in doubt. This is not 2022, when Russia’s invasion of Ukraine rerouted supply, and the world absorbed a costly but manageable adjustment. Today’s shock is destroying supply rather than rerouting it, with lost oil output already exceeding that of the 1973–74 OPEC embargo. Once liquefied natural gas, fertilizer inputs, and freight are included, the global energy bill is at least twice the crude price quoted on trading screens.

There are two starkly different readings of Iran’s intentions. According to the first, Iran is seeking full control of the strait. That path leads to a larger conflict, another blockade, and a return to the price dynamics of March, when oil prices spiked. Alternatively, Iran is behaving less like a blockader than a toll collector, maximizing the revenue it can extract from traffic through the strait. Sporadic attacks on shipping then keep the risk premium alive without choking off the flow; oil prices remain elevated and choppy rather than soaring.

The evidence so far points, tentatively, to the second reading. American strikes have deliberately avoided Iran’s energy infrastructure; Iran’s attacks on shipping have been demonstrative rather than systematic; its parliament has debated tolls on “hostile” shipping; and the MOU itself envisaged Iran’s help managing strait traffic. None of this precludes escalation—miscalculation is the Gulf’s default risk—but for now both sides appear to be contesting the price of passage rather than passage itself.

About the Author:

Gene Frieda is a former global strategist at PIMCO, is a senior visiting fellow at the London School of Economics.

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