Will the Western Balkans ever join the EU?

In 2003, the EU promised the Western Balkans that they would one day become members.

More than two decades have passed, and they are still out.

Why are they still waiting? And will that day ever come?

Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Kosovo, North Macedonia, and Montenegro — these are the so-called “Western Balkans Six”. They are all candidates for EU membership.

Yet since Croatia joined in 2013, the waiting room hasn’t emptied.

And since 2022, the debate on enlargement has been largely dominated by the question of Ukraine.

This is despite the fact that some Western Balkan countries were much more advanced in the accession process than Ukraine.

So, which countries are most likely to join first?

For now, Montenegro appears to be the closest, followed by Albania.

But even for these frontrunners, substantial obstacles remain.

The most persistent problem in the region is democratic backsliding, including systemic corruption and a lack of transparency.

Talks held in Montenegro in March highlighted that although the country is in the “endgame”, Brussels still expects it to accelerate reforms and build strong institutions capable of safeguarding democracy.

Albania’s case speaks even more clearly to this challenge. Although prime minister Edi Rama often appears to be a natural fit at the EU leaders’ table, in reality, his country has drifted toward a de facto one-party state since he came to power thirteen years ago.

According to Transparency International, Albania still records high levels of corruption.

Democratic backsliding has spread across the region. That’s at least what the 2025 Corruption Perceptions Index shows.

Does the EU bear some responsibility for this situation?

Some experts think so. They argue that aspects of EU enlargement policy have long favoured regime stability over democracy.

The process works as follows: the EU provides financial and technical assistance to candidate countries so that they can transpose what is known as the EU acquis — in other words, the EU’s rulebook.

But for many scholars, this only leads to superficial norm adoption and fails to change the political realities of the region.

Secondly, the slow pace of integration is itself part of the problem. When ruling elites see that membership is unlikely to materialise within their political careers, they have little incentive to push through difficult reforms.

However, there is a lot at stake for the EU.

Stalling enlargement also comes with growing geopolitical risks for Europe as a whole, because outside powers are trying to consolidate their influence in the region.

Just look at Serbia. Despite being a candidate country, support for EU accession there is the lowest in the region, at just 33 percent.

Under president Aleksandar Vučić, the country continues to rely on Russian gas and to deepen its cooperation with China.

The same goes for Bosnia and Herzegovina, where Republika Srpska leader Milorad Dodik openly supports closer ties with Moscow.

China has also established a significant footprint in the region, investing €32bn since 2014, largely through infrastructure and energy projects.

To break the deadlock, alternative approaches are gaining traction.

The Kosovar Centre for Security Studies advocates what it calls “operational integration” — embedding Western Balkan institutions into selected EU workflows and agencies without granting full membership.

Just a few days ago, German chancellor Friedrich Merz floated the idea of “associated countries”, which could partially take part in EU negotiations. He was mainly referring to Ukraine.

But the idea of gradual accession has long been debated and could gain momentum if the political will exists within the bloc.

But to return to our initial question: when could the Western Balkans join the bloc?

Montenegro had hoped to become a member as early as 2028 — just two years from now. But that timeline may prove difficult for all the reasons we’ve mentioned.

So the early 2030s sound more realistic — though there are absolutely no guarantees.

The EU also has internal issues to resolve before welcoming new members, including the question of unanimity on certain decisions.

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